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The purpose  of this  thesis is  to examine  the evolution of British 
images of the Chinese trader during the years  1865 to  1880 and  to deter- 
mine the   factors which influenced  these changing concepts.    A careful 
examination of articles and editorials  from the North China Herald, 
personal reminiscences,   government publications and other primary and 
secondary sources prove that British opinion of the Chinese  trader changed 
from the acceptance  of certain "myths" of Sino-British  commercial alliance 
in 1865,   to a belief in 1880 that Chinese merchants  imperiled  Britain's 
Asian trade.     British images of the Chinese merchant were influenced 
by the  complexities  of Sino-British diplomacy and by the rapid  commer- 
cial innovations  inspired by Europe's  industrial revolution. 
Special attention had  to be paid  to  the unique political and 
cultural   setting of Shanghai,  a port on the central coast of  China. 
Shanghai's prolonged  commercial predominance and wealth of published 
materials,   including the North China Herald,  made  it   the natural selec- 
tion for a focal point  in  this  study.    The North China Herald was 
perhaps   the  finest  British publication in Asia and was  noted   for its 
pro-mercantile attitude,   even   in the  face of recurrent  charges  of racism. 
No European dealt more  frequently with Chinese traders  than did  the 
treaty port merchants,   so  the pro-mercantile Herald represents  an ex- 
cellent  source of information about British images of native  traders. 
The validity of  the perceptions of  the Chinese merchant drawn 
from the North China Herald   is not  the central point of   this  study. 
Whether  the British  in  1880 were  correct  in their  conclusions about   the 
Chinese merchant   is not  as  important   as the  fact   that  the British no 
longer accepted an unsupportable myth about  the  China trade.     Through- 
out most  of the nineteenth century many British merchants  in China 
held views about   the potential    of  the China trade which more realistic 
observers   correctly  labeled as myths.     The general myth  about   the China 
trade was  predicated on a belief that   the Middle Kingdom teemed with 
millions of customers   for European goods; only  the Chinese government's 
exclusiveness and  the reluctance of the British government  to  force a 
change  stood between  foreign merchants and a  fortune in Chinese commerce. 
British  images  of  the Chinese  trader were a part  of this  myth.     The 
importance of the  changing of British  concepts  of  the Chinese merchants 
lies  in   the  fact   that  the  explosion of one of the myths  of the Chinese 
trade reflected a growing awareness  on   the part  of British entrepeneurs 
of the realities  of the China trade.     The dispersion of the myths  sur- 
rounding Chinese merchants was a smaller part  of a movement by British 
traders  to redefine  the boundaries of   foreign enterprise   in China and 
to assume  control  of Peking's   financial   structure. 
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CHAPTER  I 
INTRODUCTION 
Nineteenth-century European knowledge  of China was  greatly 
indebted  to the research of  the three preceeding centuries.     Navi- 
gators,   travelers and missionaries of  the sixteenth through eighteenth 
centuries produced   literature depicting China's  vast population,   immense 
geographic  size,   and  incredible antiquity  in such a favorable   light 
that by the end of the eighteenth  century many  Europeans had  a kind 
of mystical  awe and  envy  for "things Chinese."     Chinese silks,  dyes, 
porcelain,   and  paints had a high vogue;   Chinese decor  and pavilions 
appeared   in homes and gardens;   scholars and men of  letters  extolled 
the virtues of Chinese government.     However,  as  Europeans broke down 
the  barriers   of  Chinese   exclusiveness   in  the  late  nineteenth   century 
a different  concept  of Chinese civilization developed.     China's   collapse 
in the  face of British arms during the Opium War of  1839-42 and again 
during the Arrow War of 1859-61 changed Western respect   and admiration 
to contempt.     Most Westerners came  to view the Chinese as an  inferior 
people mired   in  tradition and  shackled  by unwarranted vanities.     The 
image of  the Chinese as  an  inferior people was  popular   into the  twen- 
tieth century when shifting political  circumstances  thrust  her  forward 
as  a military ally.     Indeed  some nineteenth century ethnic attitudes 
remain  even   today  and   their   existence   is  due  in   large  part   to  the 
mass  of   literature   left  by  those Westerners  who  actually  had  treated 
with the Chinese   in their native land.     These works   included diplomatic 
correspondence and memoirs,  missionary publications,   and mercantile 
reports,   returns,  and newsletters.     In the mid-nineteenth century, 
the foreign merchants who  lived   in  scattered  ports along the coast 
of China  significantly contributed  to the mainstream of Western  images 
of the Chinese.    The purpose of this paper  is  to examine  the evolution 
of British mercantile  images of  the Chinese with whom he was most 
familiar,   the native  trader,  and  to determine what   factors  influenced 
those  images. 
Mercantile publications  from the China  coast and articles  from 
British and American journals provide a general pattern of develop- 
ment of  foreign  images of Chinese merchants.     Mercantile attitudes 
of the British community  in Shanghai between  1865 and   1880 will be 
reviewed.     The year   1865 marked the end of the disastrous Taiping 
Revolution   in China and  the beginning of a return of normalcy to the 
operations  of  foreign and domestic  commerce.    After that date  trade 
and  customs   statistics  became more reliable and  foreign trade exhibited 
enough consistency to allow careful analysis.     The year   1880 concluded 
this study;   by this date   foreign  commercial opinion about  the Chinese 
merchant  solidified and remained unchanged until  the  twentieth century. 
The  selection of Shanghai as  a focal point  of  this study  is of a 
more decided  nature than the  chronological delimitations.     Shanghai's 
continued primacy  in Chinese  foreign  trade,   its   independent  and highly 
organized municipal governing body,   and   its role as a center of mercan- 
tile publications qualified   it  as  the  strongest  example of British com- 
mercial opinion on the China  coast.     Throughout  the nineteenth century, 
Shanghai  carried the bulk of China's   foreign trade.     So great was  the 
commercial   importance of Shanghai  that  a resident  immodestly though 
quite correctly stated   in  1869,   "The heart of foreign trade  is Shanghai, 
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and all  other ports mere bloodvessels."    Shanghai's municipal  council 
and mixed  court represented  the  closest approximation of self govern- 
ment on the  China coast.     Complete with administrative and  judicial 
powers,   Shanghai stood  as  a center of western  institutional  and  com- 
mercial philosophy.     Shanghai's administrative organs mobilized and 
articulated mercantile opinion   in a manner unrivaled by other nine- 
teenth-century treaty ports. Moreover Shanghai was  the place of publi- 
cation of the North China Herald, possibly the  finest newspaper edited 
in Asia.     Extremely  independent and  representative of commercial view- 
points,   the North China Herald  is  the best barometer available  for 
measuring  foreign mercantile attitudes.    Thus Shanghai  offered  the 
best  source  for  sampling British mercantile opinion  in the dozen or 
so treaty ports. 
Between   1865 and  1880 British mercantile attitude  toward  the 
Chinese  trader underwent  considerable  change.     British opinion  serving 
from a positive,   almost "comrade-in-arms" relationship  in  1865  to an 
opposite reaction by 1880 when the Chinese  trader was depicted as a 
negative and  sometimes malevolent   influence on Asian commerce.     British 
mercantile attitudes were  tightly   interwoven with the rapid  technological 
innovations of Europe's  industrial revolution and  the complexities of 
British and Chinese  foreign policy.     Between  1865 and  1870 the strongest 
influences on British mercantile opinion of the Chinese trader were the 
commercial  successes  that resulted  from English victories  in the Opium 
and Arrow Wars.     Military success gave new life to the dying dream of 
commercial  fortune  in China.     The   cessation of the Taiping Revolution 
in 1865 provided more  fuel  for the British merchants rekindled optimism. 
Prior  to 1865   foreign merchants  found the Chinese  trade disastrous,  yet 
a  few clung steadfastly to myths about the unopened  Chinese market. 
Great   Britain  had   carried  on trade with China since the seventeenth 
century and by the middle  of  the nineteenth century  certain   images 
of  the Chinese were broadly accepted  by foreign merchants.     The most 
notable aspect   of Chinese  character was supposedly a  love of commercial 
enterprise.    An anonymous   account  entitled  "A Dissertation Upon  the 
Commerce of China" written   in Canton   in 1838 makes  the following ob- 
servation about  Chinese  commercial  attitudes: 
Trade   is not here  confined  to one  class of men,  but  to 
all  ranks and ages.   .   .   .     Commerce is  the   invariable  topic 
of  conversations,   the most   important pursuit,   the highest 
object of pleasure,  and  the very  goal of all  their wishes. 
Trade  is the  first and   last word   in which all unanimously 
join, whilst  the energies of mind and body are  consumed   in 
following up  this bent.   .   .   . 
British merchants  saw  the China market as El  Dorado:     an 
immense population of eager   traders,   hard workers  and willing buyers. 
The British believed that   from a  functional  point of view,   the Chinese 
commercial  system was more or less  the same as  that  of any European 
country.     The division of  labor among merchants  in China could be 
equated   to wholesale dealers  and brokers on both the national and 
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on  the domestic  level.       The  British reasoned  that  the benefits and 
rewards  available  from international   trade would be   irresistible  to 
a  commercial   system much  like   that  of   the West.     Furthermore,   British 
merchants   felt  that   foreign   commerce was  so   interwoven with Chinese 
prosperity that,   to  cut   it  off would aim a deathblow at  the Chinese 
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public welfare. 
The  only opposition to the  growth of western enterprise   in 
China seemed  to stem from the ruling elite,  or   the Mandarin  class. 
British merchants depicted  the Mandarins as  intelligent,   selfish and 
extortionate.     Prevarication or outright   falsehood  characterized 
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their official  and private  conduct.      Treaty port residents believed, 
and  correctly so,   that  the Chinese elite passionately resisted  foreign 
economic penetration because  their position depended on the maintenance 
of a social   status quo.    Thus prior to 1865,   the basic tenets  of British 
merchants  relating to the China trade were  these:     a firm belief  in the 
existence of a Chinese  commercial  spirit,   a confidence   in  the  compati- 
bility of European and Chinese marketing systems and a  conviction that 
the Chinese   scholar-bureaucrats would resist any   form of commercial 
advancement,   short  of force. 
The myths   concerning the China market were  not  the only factors 
influencing British  images of the native trader.     The policies of the 
British Foreign Office contributed  to the attitudes of the  treaty 
port residents.     By  1865  the British government  had adopted  a "Co-opera- 
tive" policy regarding China.     The  crux of  this policy stressed minimal 
interference   in Chinese affairs  because in  the view of the British 
government   the China trade was  not  of sufficient   importance  to justify 
costly wars  and the risks of establishing a British empire  in China. 
British merchants   thought  this policy retarded  their efforts at  the 
economic penetration of China.    As  a result  the  British merchants 
spent  the next   forty years at odds with Foreign Office policy.    Part 
of  the mercantile resistance to Foreign Office policy involved  the 
Chinese  trader.     British merchants  justified  their aggressive political 
demands by contending that  a large segment of  the Chinese population, 
especially those  interested  in commerce, wanted and needed   foreign 
guidance and  instruction.     British merchants vigorously maintained 
that  the Chinese ruling elite,  a small  fraction of the populace, 
kept  China in a  state of perpetual   intellectual  and  technological 
stagnation.     On  the other hand,   they maintained  Chinese  commercial 
elements represented the  forces of modernization and social  evolution 
that would allow China to become a  full partner   in the world wide 
diplomatic theater.    Thus between  1865 and   1870 a combination of 
centuries old preconceptions  and more  immediate Foreign Office policy 
led  the British merchant  to see the  native   trader as a type of  trans- 
cultural ally--a  bridge spanning the  gaps  of cultural and diplomatic 
differences.     Under the existing political  circumstances  the Chinese 
merchant represented a useful  tool  to accomplish  commercial  objectives 
such as   the opening of the   interior   to trade,   the removal of  inland 
taxation and   the   improvement  of local  communications.     British merchants 
hoped  that by  careful cultivation of  their relationship with  the Chinese 
trader  the motives of common cause and economic  interest would win out 
over the  cultural  and diplomatic differences  that made economic pene- 
tration of China  impossible.     Carried  to extremes,   the British hopes 
included   the creation of a politically active pressure group  from the 
Chinese  traders and an eventual  change in China's  domestic posture. 
In  1870 the  China market underwent a dramatic transformation. 
The  introduction of  the steamship and   the telegraph shortened   the 
distance between Europe and China and  altered  the role of the  treaty 
port merchant.     Because of  faster communications with his home  office 
the  British merchant   in China  lost the  independence of action which 
characterized his earlier dealings.    British merchants  purchased  from 
native traders  only what was  required by the home office;   thus while 
the  changes of dramatic  failure were  lessened,   the opportunities   for 
sudden success   through speculation were all but eliminated.     The 
British merchant of  1870 only vaguely resembled the  free-wheeling 
commercial  adventurer of earlier years.    As  the romance and  glamour 
of the China market disappeared with  improved   communications British 
merchants  developed new images of the China  trade and  the Chinese 
merchant.     The  general myths  associated with  the Chinese market  as 
a commercial El  Dorado persisted although much weakened by the realities 
of poor trade returns.    Likewise the   idea of the Chinese merchant as 
a social reformer began to lose  force and by   1875 only passing refer- 
ence   to such a concept appeared   in mercantile publications.     The 
social  reformer scheme   lost   impetus because of a  fundamental  change 
in  the   British   image  of  the   Chinese  merchant   between   1870  and   1875. 
Prior  to 1870  the British merchant's   image of  the Chinese  trader 
involved  a  careful  distinction  between   the  Chinese  merchant   and   other 
Chinese,   especially  the  scholar-gentry  class.     An  examination  of  mer- 
cantile  publications   after   1870  reveals   a  blurring  of   the   lines  of 
social   superiority  that   had  been   conferred  by  the  pursuit  of  commercial 
endeavors.     By   1875  British merchants   saw  the   native   traders   as   in- 
fluenced  more   by  the  negative   characteristics   of  his  race   than  by  the 
higher  cultural values  associated with  international   trade.     Undoubtedly 
the behavior  on activities of  the Chinese merchants did not   change with- 
in a ten year  span  to the degree   indicated by  the  change in  the British 
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image of native  traders.     British mercantile opinion was  influenced 
by factors  other  than the behavior of native  traders. 
The  changing of British mercantile images  of the Chinese trader 
after  1870 was a part of a reaction   to the difficulties of  the China 
trade.     Despite   improved means  of transportation and  communication be- 
tween Europe and Asia the China market  continued  to show little evidence 
of viability.    As  the realities of  lowered profits  and poor  trade returns 
began to dispel  the   illusions  of a profitable China  trade,   treaty 
port residents   looked about   for  causes of their   failure.    British 
merchants denounced   the Co-operative Policy as  the major obstacle to 
the advancement  of  foreign trade and   then turned  their attack   toward 
China's antiquated   foreign policy.    All Chinese,   even  the native 
mercantile   community,   came  under   increased  suspect   of  culturally  bound 
inferiorities which made regular commerce an  impossibility.     The once 
famed reliability of  the Chinese merchant disappeared and  in  its place 
came  the  notion  of  Chinese   trickery  and   inherent  dishonesty.     The  image 
of   the  Chinese  merchant  as  a  disruptive   force   in  Europe's  Asiatic  trade 
solidified during the  early years of  the seventies.     Thus, as  a result 
of  poor  trade returns  and an all  too rapid  technological  transformation 
of   the  treaty port business  the British  image of  the Chinese merchant 
began a perceptible drift   towards  the generalized racial conceptions 
of  the day. 
In the   late  1870's  the negative   images of the  Chinese began  to 
take  definite   form.     The   concept   of  the   Chinese  merchant  as  a   commercial 
brethren and   cultural ally was dead by  1880.     In place of this   image the 
British substituted  the   idea of a vengeful enemy using commercial means 
to strike back  for diplomatic and military defeats.     British mercantile 
interests pointed with dismay to the  increasing number  of Chinese  com- 
mercial  ventures   throughout Asia  in such ports as   Bangkok, Rangoon,  and 
Manila.     Some  of  the more pessimistic sources predicted  an invasion of 
"Celestials"   into what had before been almost solely British trading 
reserves   such as  India.    The very social  class that the  British mer- 
chants  saw as  their  only friend   in an alien   culture during the  1860's 
had by   1880 become  as much an enemy as China's ruling elite.     Further- 
more   Chinese  merchants   appeared   to  be waging  a winning war while   the 
Ch'ing  dynasty was  most   certainly   crumbling.      It   is  of   little wonder 
that   the activities of  the Chinese merchant   created  a disturbance 
among British  traders  on the  China coast. 
This  final   step   in the hardening of British attitude toward  the 
Chinese merchant  remained as an accepted   image  far   longer  than  the 
shortlived  "cultural  ally" theory of the   late  sixties.     The image of 
the Chinese merchant as a sinister and  somehow overwhelming threat   to 
Western commercial   supremacy  in Asia remained  strong until the  twen- 
tieth century.    While British mercantile   images of  the Chinese  trader 
contribute only a  small part  to our understanding of nineteenth  century 
cultural perspectives,   this topic  is of great   significance  in the develop- 
ment  of  China's  non-agrarian  economy.     The   significance  of   the  development 
of British  images of  the  Chinese merchant   lay not  so much with the validity 
of their assessments  or with the methods of drawing their  conclusions,  as 
with the ultimate result of such conclusions.     As British   commercial   in- 
terests gradually came  to perceive   the Chinese merchant as an exceptionally 
capable   and   sometimes   unbeatable   competitor  on  his  home  ground,   they 
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sought different  sources   of  income.     Foreign  interests   invested   less 
in actual   exchange of goods and  turned  increasingly to  the auxiliaries 
of  trade  such as banking and  transportation.     By the time of World War 1 
China was deeply  in debt   to various   foreign creditors and  foreign 
owned railroads and  stamship   lines returned  steady profits.    The 
lessons were painful   for   the mid-century British merchant  but   they 
were a necessary part  of  the  commercial education thai    permitted 
him  to  approach  economic   control  of  China  by  the   twentieth  century. 
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CHAPTER  II 
SHANGHAI  AND THE  CHINA TRADE 
The British mercantile  community of Shanghai  looked   forward 
to the year   1865  in hopes  that   it would prove  to be a watershed   in 
the course of Chinese  foreign  trade.     British merchants had operated 
from Shanghai  since 1843 with little success.     Not  only had China's 
foreign market   failed  to  live up to expectations but   in  1850 a series 
of  internal disorders wrecked China's domestic market.    The   inter- 
ference with transportation and  communication created by the Taiping 
Revolution  (1850-1865)   assured  the collapse of many British  firms' 
faltering, businesses.     By 1865 only the  largest   firms remained and 
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some observers predicted   their   impending decline.       However,   in that 
same year   the  Chinese  government   crushed   the  Taiping  Revolution  and 
restored domestic  tranquillity.    As  regularized  trading relations  re- 
sumed between the  coast and  the  interior,  British merchants  sounded 
new  notes  of  optimism: 
A confident   feeling in the China trade becoming once 
more profitable  begins  to revive  in mens'   breasts.    A suc- 
cession of  failures has weeded  out much that was unsound 
in the general  state of affairs and  the closure of the 
weaker banks has removed the mad  competition which afforded 
undue   facilities  to speculators. 
The Shanghai merchant's  confidence in 1867 was  strikingly similar 
to the mood of earlier British traders on the China coast.    The dif- 
ference between the  Shanghai merchant of 1843 and his  counterpart  of 
1865 was  in  their varying degrees of experience with the China  trade. 
British commercial optimism of the  1840's was based on a record of success 
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outside China.     British expansion  into the China market   followed an 
established pattern of commercial conquest  in Asia.     British traders 
established  treaty ports  beside  the walls  of major trade centers   in 
an effort  to "tap"  the established market.    This method was not new; 
the British had  used a similar pattern during the sixteenth and seven- 
teenth  centuries   in South and Southeast Asia.    Trading  factories and 
forts established  at scattered points on the  coastal   fringes of 
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Ceylon,   Bengal,  Java,  and Luzon had  been very successful. 
The British merchants'  experience with the China  trade was of 
a very different nature  than their other Asiatic trade.     The Opium 
War of   1839-1842 and the Arrow War of  1856-1860 provided  the diplomatic 
and military  impetus  to extend British commercial outposts  from the 
single port of Canton to fifteen other  locations along the China coast. 
The opening of  these ports  ushered   in  the most glamorous  era  in the 
annals of  Eastern  trade,   the  era of the China clipper.     From  1840 to 
1876 these sleek vessels dominated  China's  foreign trade,   carrying 
tea,  raw and manufactured  silk,   scarves,   screens and  lacquered wares 
to Europe,   and bringing into China opium and  cotton goods.     Despite 
the romance and  glamour of the China market,   trade returns were unin- 
spiring.     After some  initial  success   in the early 1840's  British mer- 
chants   found  the China trade   increasingly unprofitable.     Chinese 
peasants did not  purchase European   imports except opium.     British firms 
made only  inconsistent profits  from tea and  silk exports due  to a variety 
of factors   that affected  local production such as unfavorable weather 
or governmental  interference   in the  form of arbitrary taxation.     By the 
late   1850's   the balance of trade began  to favor China largely due to a 
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decrease in opium importation.    The Chinese met  opium demand by culti- 
vation of their own  fields and as a result  silver  ceased  to  flow from 
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the country   in the volume recorded   in the early  1840's.     The outbreak 
of  the Taiping Revolution   in 1850 meant severe  irregularities   in an 
already declining  foreign trade.     For most British  firms  the revolt 
was   the  commercial   coup de grace that drove them from the China coast. 
In spite of  the succession of commercial  failures  between   1842 
and   1865  the  British community of Shanghai expressed the  same  optimism 
as  the  founders of Britain's China trade some  twenty years  before. 
Shanghai's commercial optimism in  the  late sixties was based  on a 
belief in the  strength of  the city's  commercial and administrative 
bodies.     These  institutions, which  included the Maritime  Customs,   the 
Municipal Council,  and  the Mixed Court,   all developed during roughly 
the same period as  the Taiping Rebellion and  the Shanghai merchants 
eagerly    anticipated   their  effect on more normal  trading conditions. 
It was generally believed  that  these new administrative and   judicial 
bodies would exercise a regulatory influence on the  China trade which 
had been  lacking before the Taiping Revolution.     Shanghai's Municipal 
Council,   Customs,  and Mixed  Court received a great deal of the   credit 
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for Shanghai's   emergence as   Britain's most successful treaty port. 
The Shanghai Municipal Council,   the administrative organ  of govern- 
ment at  Shanghai, originated   in negotiations between  the British consul 
George Balfour,   and local Chinese officials.     These  negotiations,  known 
as  the Land Regulations of  1843,  gave   land holders the right   to maintain 
and police  their section of  the city.  A revised set  of Land Regulations 
in 1854 established a Municipal Council as an elected representative 
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body,   a police force,  and a system of compulsory taxation.     Diffi- 
culties arose over  the application of the  1854 Regulations   to 
inhabitants  of different  nationalities and as a result another 
revision was negotiated  between British and Chinese officials in 
March  of  1866.    The 1866 revision granted administrative powers 
to a Municipal Council   composed of elected representatives   from any 
of the various  land-holding    nationalities.    The diplomatic represen- 
tation of Great Britain,   the United  States,   France,  Russia and the 
North German Confederation provisionally approved  the  third revision 
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of the Land Regulations   in  1869.       In   fact   the Municipal Council 
consistently exercised  fuller powers   than actually granted   either by 
treaty with  the Chinese or  by agreement with  foreign diplomatic 
representatives.     From a "committee" having only superficial   admini- 
strative  powers pertaining to the maintenance of  sanitation and 
utilities,   the Muncipal Council  grew into a  complete administrative 
body with police and   taxation powers. 
The  inhabitants of Shanghai drew inspiration  from the Municipal 
Council   in  two seemingly contradictory ways.     First,   the Muncipal 
Council represented   the  introduction of western principles  of   legality 
into what   the British merchant  considered a  socially archaic and hostile 
culture.     In the mind  of the British mercantile  community,   the  Board 
of Trade   failed  to produce  the necessary protection and  stimulation  for 
a healthy  foreign trade in China.     Therefore the merchants attempted  to 
govern themselves in a manner beneficial to their trade.    The  establish- 
ment of the Municipal  Council provided   the necessary legal  foundation 
for expansion of a faltering trade: 
16 
What do we  see at  the end of  1865?    The municipal  councils, 
whose authority was  confirmed by  the decision of the tribunals, 
have recalled dissidents  to order;   placed   financial matters on 
a proper  footing and restored public confidence.   .   .   .     From a 
commercial point  of view,   it   is true,   the condition of Shanghai 
is no   longer  the same   .   .   .   [however]   trade made by  foreigners 
has a vitality of its own and rests upon such foundations   that 
progress   it must, whereas,   at second rate ports,   it would de- 
crease and be absorbed by native  companies. 
Moreover,   the Municipal Council mobilized and articulated 
mercantile  response  to the policy of the British government.     Official 
British policy regarding the China trade was based on  the Mitchell 
Report.    This report,  although written  in 1852,  did  not become policy 
until   1863 when  the Foreign Office adopted the "Co-operative" policy. 
In  1852, Mitchell,   an assistant magistrate at Hongkong,  prepared  for 
Sir George  Bonham,   then Governor  of Hongkong and Superintendent of 
Trade,  a report  on  the prospects   for  foreign trade  in China.     The 
report argued  that  the self-sufficient  nature of the  Chinese  economy 
would preclude any chance  for meaningful profit   from international 
8 
commerce.       In  the  view of  the British government   the China trade was 
not  of sufficient   importance  to  justify costly wars and  the risks of 
establishing a British empire  in China.     This Co-operative policy, 
according to Mary C.   Wright meant  co-operation on the part  of Great 
Britain,  the  United  States,   France,   Russia and China to secure the 
peaceful settlement  of disputes and   the gradual modernization of 
9 
China.     Therefore England  supported   the Chinese government against 
10 
its enemies   the    rebels,   provincial malcontents,  or  foreign merchants. 
The "one great  object of offical policy was   to diminish points of  con- 
11 
tact  between British traders  and native customers."      Of their diplomatic 
representatives,   the  Shanghai Chamber of Commerce remarked: 
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Removed   from any  contact with   foreign merchants,   and the 
influence of public opinion,   the Foreign Ministers  become 
in measure  advocates of Chinese  exclusiveness rather than 
the extention of foreign trade.1^ 
Belief that  their home government was unresponsive and hostile 
led  the British merchants in Shanghai  to rely on their   local   institutions 
as a  source  of strength.     However,   Shanghai's municipal  growth was  not 
the only reason  for optimism  in the  60's.    Two  institutional develop- 
ments   of a  commercial and  legal nature contributed measurably to 
Shanghai's   commercial outlook:     the   Imperial Maritime Customs  and 
the Shanghai Mixed Court.     The Imperial Maritime Customs  began during 
the Tai-ping Rebellion when,   in  1854,   Chinese authorities  in Shanghai 
failed   to collect   the  customs revenue.     Rutherford Alcock,   the British 
consul  at  Shanghai wished  to maintain a legal basis  for  trade even in 
the absence  of Chinese officials.    Alcock instituted a "Provisional 
System"  of  customs   collection by which British and American consuls 
collected promisory notes   for  the amount of customs duties due  the 
Chinese government.    The  "Provisional  System" worked so well  that after 
a  short  period of resistance  by treaty port merchants and   local Ch'ing 
officials  it was   instituted as a Maritime Customs  at Shanghai.       The 
consuls   of foreign powers  assumed responsibility  for revenue collection 
and nominated   three   inspectors   to be appointed by the Chinese govern- 
ment  to enforce  treaty agreements and   customs  regulations.     In 1863, 
Robert Hart became   inspector  general and  for  forty-five years he 
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served  the Chinese  government   in this   capacity. 
The Imperial Maritime Customs represented a major step toward 
the  creation of conditions under which western  commercial  growth  could 
prosper.     The new Customs removed the difficulties and financial  losses 
18 
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incurred while dealing with  the old  Ch'ing customs.     Ch'ing Customs 
was  riddled with  corruption  and had  been thoroughly inefficient. 
The Taiping Rebellion provided   the occasion to remove a cumbersome 
obstacle  to the  free  flow of  trade  in  Shanghai.    The use of   foreign 
officials   in a basically Chinese  institution was an innovation in 
both  the   commercial and diplomatic spheres.     The Customs gave Shanghai 
a reputation among foreigners  as  a commercial sanctuary comparatively 
free   from the tradition and precedent   that  stifled  commerce elsewhere. 
The authority of the Customs  expanded   to cover all   treaty ports  in  1858, 
but   the  concept  of Shanghai as  "an  innovator"  in Sino-British relations 
remained with its   inhabitants. 
The establishment of  the Shanghai Mixed  Court on May  1,   1864 
provided a second  example of Shanghai's   increased western character. 
Prior  to 1863,   the various  consuls of the treaty ports heard  cases  of 
a "mixed" nature,   involving Chinese and  foreign nationalities.    The 
sheer bulk of cases  at Shanghai made it  impractical   for the residing 
consuls  to hear  cases.     In  1863   the British consul   in Shanghai,  Sir 
Harry Parkes,   formulated a plan  to lift  the burden   from the port  con- 
suls.     Parkes proposed a mixed   court,  presided over by a Chinese 
magistrate with a  foreign "assessor"  in attendance as an advisor. 
The mercantile body hoped  that  a new legal  code would develop as a 
result of the influence of the   foreign assessors,   because  the mixed 
court   judged each case on  its  own merit  rather  than by reliance on 
judicial precedent.     British merchants  believed that with experience, 
the mixed   court would gradually develop  a new legal  code in alignment 
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with western  standards without  violating Chinese penal  code or  custom. 
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In this manner,   the merchants of Shanghai hoped  to be  free   from the 
disparities  of the Chinese and  English  legal  codes which often stifled 
the  free  flow of foreign commodities. 
The establishment  of the Shanghai Mixed Court,   the Imperial 
Maritime Customs,  and  the Shanghai Municipal Council affected  the 
attitudes of the local mercantile community  towards  themselves and 
their  home government.     These  institutions  represented   innovations 
in Anglo-Chinese relations and  the Shanghai   inhabitants displayed an 
immense pride   in their development.    A letter to the North China 
Herald provided an  interesting  insight   into   the Shanghai merchant's 
view of himself and his   city: 
The dream of the Free  City,   based  on the precedent  afforded 
by the mercantile republics  of  the ancient days has perhaps 
excited more ridicule  than  it deserved.     It  is easy to scoff 
at  the  idea of a body of men existing on  the  coast  of a 
foreign and semi-civilized  country,   and   living on without 
the aid of a navy or military  force  to uphold  them in their 
position.     But,   strangely enough these much scandalized 
traders have shown themselves  singularly qualified   for 
self-government.    They have  flung narrow and obstructive 
national  prejudices  to  the winds,   and have co-operated  to 
produce a  state of things of which  they may be reasonably 
proud.     Is  it quite without   the verge of probability, ere 
many years  are over,   the Settlement may be even better able 
to go alone,   than  it   is at this day? 
In the mind of her   inhabitants,  Shanghai's institutions 
represented an   isolated   instance of unbridled mercantile 
enterprise;   the natural result was  Shanghai's  primacy among treaty 
ports  in  terms  of bulk of carrying trade.    Shanghai's  success 
originated  in the  flexibility of her  institutional development. 
Likewise,   the   failures of other ports   lay in   the attempt  "to estab- 
lish a  logically perfect   system, with the usual result of demonstrably 
18 
perfect  schemes,   that of breaking down on the   first  strain." 
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Connercial   success,   the  inhabitants of Shanghai reasoned,   remained 
unattainable  in ports  "narrowly and jealously administered   by nominees 
19 
of the Colonial Office"       such as Hong Kong. 
Shanghai's  sense of political uniqueness and pride  in her 
relatively  strong  trade produced a sense of haughty self-righteous- 
ness.     The members of the Colonial Office   took particular offense 
and often referred  sarcastically to the mercantile community as  the 
20 
"merchant princes."      In a larger  sense  than is  implied by  the develop- 
ment of a viable  city administration,   the  Shanghai merchants   fulfilled 
the role of "merchant prince."    The mercantile houses   in Shanghai 
functioned as  economic mediators,   spanning both geographic and cul- 
tural distance.     The geographic distance  between the Shanghai merchant 
and his home  office made him a semi-independent operator;   he was the 
man on the spot who actually did the  job,   free from immediate  control 
by superiors   in Great Britain.     He was  indeed master of his   own ship; 
his success or  failure depended on his  initiative and  fortitude.    The 
Shanghai merchant  found  the  cultural  barrier more difficult   to span 
than the geographic.     Individual action failed  to  transcend   cultural 
differences;   therefore  the Shanghai merchant relied upon his  political, 
juridical and   fiscal  systems.     Through them he planned eventual con- 
quest of  the China market.    The Shanghai merchant   felt  that   the  irresis- 
tible  logic of western civilization would  break down  cultural  barriers 
and allow the   free  flow of trade.     In this  sense,   the Shanghai merchant 
was   indeed a merchant prince;   arrogant  from his comparative economic 
success,   prideful of his  city's  institutional growth,  aggressive and 
abrasive because of  the  independence and  initiative required   to  function 
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efficiently despite vast distances,  and unwavering  in his  belief in 
the  superior merits of western  civilization,  the Shanghai "merchant 
prince" aspired  to control  the  foreign  trade of China. 
The Shanghai merchant's  optimism about   foreign trade,   so 
strongly based  on institutional and  cultural superiority,   found 
statistical rational   in the  trade returns of the 1860's.    After 1865 
China's  foreign commerce gradually recovered  from the effects of the 
Taiping Revolution.     The  total   foreign trade of China rose  from 
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105,300,087 taels in 1864  to 130,972,843  taels  in 1870. Several 
treaty ports remained pessimistic about  the  future of the China trade; 
however Shanghai merchants   looked  forward  to the realization of an 
immensely profitable business as   the commercial managers  of China's 
foreign trade. 
The optimism of  the British merchants  in Shanghai after 1865 
was voiced   in  their commercial  reports  to  the Foreign Office and  in 
the weekly editions of the North  China Herald.    Mercantile optimism 
resulted   from the  increasingly favorable  trade returns between 1865 
and  1870.     British merchants pointed  to Shanghai's   institutional 
development as  the reason for their enlarged profits.     Shanghai's 
Municipal  Council, Mixed Court,  and Maritime Customs received credit 
as  the foundation of Shanghai's  commercial  success  until  the  1920's. 
In the second decade of the  twentieth century China presented  its 
case for national  integrity  to the  international  community.     Chinese 
nationalists  centered many of their pleas   for independence from 
foreign  control around  the   issue  of extraterritoriality.    Sympathizers 
of the Chinese nationalist   cause argued  that  institutions such as  the 
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Shanghai Municipal Council and  the Shanghai Mixed Court  constituted 
unwarranted encroachments of China's sovereignty.     The Shanghai Muni- 
cipal  Council  steadfastly  insisted that  the  "western" nature of 
Shanghai's   judicial and administrative  institutions was solely 
responsible  for the  city's  commercial  success  and  that under Chinese 
22 
administration  their lucrative business would  fail.       The question of 
extraterritoriality was  settled   in  1919 when the Chinese Nationalist 
party  forcibly nullified   foreign  jurisdiction on Chinese soil. 
Recent  historical   investigation indicates  that  Shanghai's 
commercial success was due  to its  location at   the mouth of  the Yangtze 
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River  Basin.       This  river basin  is an agricultural and  industrial 
center  for central  China;  Shanghai's position near  the  coast made   it 
a natural  clearance site  for both  the  imported and exported materials 
of   the entire basin.     The Treaty of Tientsin  (1858)   opened  the Yangtze 
River  to steam navigation and provided  that  three ports be opened  to 
foreign  trade.     Consular  trade reports   in the middle and  late  1860's 
from the Yangtze ports  indicated   the mass shipment of exports  to Shang- 
hai  for re-export and   the reception from Shanghai of the bulk of their 
24 
imports,  principally opium.       However,   even as   late as   1920  the Shanghai 
mercantile  community clung to the notion that  the  city's administrative 
and   judicial  institutions were responsible  for the port's success. 
The strength of the Shanghai mercantile  community's belief   in 
their  institutional  system cannot be overemphasized as a  formative   factor 
in  their  image of the  China trade.     The Shanghai merchants of  1865 be- 
lieved  that  through their own efforts  they  could  bring prosperity to 
a broad   commercial venture  that had already been proven financially 
23 
disastrous.     Their strong belief  in the  institutional superiority 
of western culture versus  that of  the Chinese  civilization colored 
25 
their perceptions of the China trade. 
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CHAPTER  III 
CHINESE MERCHANTS AND THE MYTH OF COMMERCIAL ALLIANCE 
As Shanghai's  sluggish  trade recovered   from the effects of 
the Taiping Revolution and began to gain momentum in the   late 
1860's a disturbing footnote  to the  increased volume of trade 
appeared;  as  trade  increased,   Chinese merchants  claimed a growing 
share of the profit.     In  1868 the North China Herald reported "with 
the  exception of Shanghai,   Foochow and Hanhow,   trade has virtually 
left   the hands of  foreigners and  their  interest   in the small ports 
1 
is   tending rather  to decrease  than improve."      The Customs report 
of  1866 indicated  the extent of Chinese  control over the  internal 
marketing of  foreign goods such as grey shirtings,  opium,   sugar and 
2 
oils.       Chinese merchants owned   two-thirds of the opium and over 
four-fifths of the piece goods  shipped  from Shanghai to ports on the 
3 
Yangtze  in 1866. 
In  1869,   S.  W. Williams,   a noted missionary and admirer of 
Shanghai's  commercial development,   commented about Chinese enterprise 
in Shanghai:   "...   the Chinese are showing that  they are  fully able 
and   inclined  to keep their own trade  in their own hands,   and   its 
4 
gradual enlargement will depend  upon  their wants and  industry."    The 
mercantile body  in Shanghai agreed with Dr. William's assessment. 
Editorials published  in the North China Herald between  1865 and  1870 
stressed  the acceptance of the Chinese merchants'   "natural" advantages, 
i.e.,  better  local  information,   protection by guilds and greater 
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economy in business.       The editor argued  that   increased  trade neces- 
6 
sitated "hundreds more to share it,"    and that  Chinese participation 
in foreign commerce assured a "broader and deeper  current, which,   if 
it promises a slower progress offers on the other hand,   a surer 
7 
guarantee  for the  steadiness of its  future course."    Furthermore, 
increased Chinese participation  in foreign trade represented the  first 
step in the  "rapid and  irresistible" opening of China to western civi- 
8 
lization.       The  tone of  the articles concerning Chinese  competition 
did not  convey the belligerency that might have been expected from 
the Shanghai "merchant prince."    Instead, mercantile opinion  in the 
late 1860's drifted  toward acceptance of  the  situation and   concilia- 
tory relations with the ever  increasing number  of Chinese  competitors. 
In light of the aggressive and  combative nature  of the Shanghai "mer- 
chant prince" such a passive stance  concerning their  future on the 
China coast  seems  contradictory. 
The relative quiescence with which the Shanghai merchant viewed 
his  jeopardized position as   commercial manager of Chinese  foreign trade 
paralleled his attitude regarding diplomatic developments  in  the mid- 
sixties.    Prior to  1860 the  Shanghai mercantile  community supported 
elements in the British government  that  favored   forcible opening of 
China to trade;   likewise,  a storm of debate hung  over mercantile-govern- 
mental relations when the policies  of the Foreign Office failed  to please 
the China traders.     However,   in the mid-sixties,   the Shanghai mercantile 
community's political policies  reflected relatively stable relations 
with the Foreign Office.    The major political debate of the decade con- 
cerned ratification of a revision of the 1858 Treaty of Tientsin,   the 
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Alcock Convention.    The Convention, provisionally negotiated by Great 
Britain and  China in October 1869,  revised tariff and  commercial 
articles of prior treaties.    Ratification of the Convention raised a 
storm of controversy among British merchants   in Great Britain and 
China.     The "Old China Hands" at home organized an intensive propaganda 
9 
campaign against ratification in  late  1869.       The "Old China Hands"  in 
England adopted   the rhetoric of the majority of  the treaty port merchants 
in China;   they argued that   the Convention failed to satisfy the   long- 
10 
range goals  of British commerce in Asia.      However  the British merchants 
in Shanghai sounded a different note.    As early as   1867,   the Shanghai 
Chamber of Commerce stated   its belief that the original Treaty of 
Tientsin provided all the provisions  requisite  for expanded China 
trade and  on November 26,   1869,  the Chamber voted qualified acceptance 
11 
of the Convention.      Nathan Pelcovits,   in Old China Hands  and  the 
Foreign Office,   stated:     "The intensive propaganda  campaign against 
ratification   .   .   .  appears   to have  stemmed not  from the treaty ports 
12 
but  from Old China Hands at  Home";     Shanghai in particular  claimed no 
responsibility  for active  interference  in  the debate on the Alcock 
Convention.     The  British government  refused  to ratify the Alcock Con- 
vention because  of pressure   from mercantile circles,   but  the merchants 
of Shanghai played no significant role as advocates  of mercantile demands. 
The Shanghai merchants displayed much the  same attitude  toward 
their Chinese competition as   toward their diplomatic antagonists.    The 
watchword of the mid-sixties was conciliation,  both  in commercial  and 
political spheres.     Shanghai's   trade recovery after the disasters of 
previous twenty years was the most complete of all  the  treaty ports. 
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Shanghai merchants accepted any concessions offered on the grounds  that 
"every step towards  freer  intercourse,   like the progress of a stone 
rolling down hill, renders   further progress more rapid and  irresistible." 
The difficult years of the Taiping Rebellion had  left the Shanghai mer- 
chant with a  cautious attitude toward the China trade.     He was,   for the 
moment,   content with increased trade and reluctant  to rattle his  sword 
at  British diplomat or Chinese merchant. 
The  Shanghai merchants'  reluctance  to disturb conditions of 
profitable   trade only partly explains  their attitude  toward the 
emergence of  the  Chinese mercantile  class.    British co-existence with 
Chinese competition arose mainly from the popular nineteenth century 
concepts of  commercialism and  free trade.     In a specific reference to 
the China trade an advocate of the benefits of free  trade  commented: 
The merchant  is acting,   and must act  a leading part   in 
the grand drama of universal amelioration.     His  in- 
fluence,   if consecrated   to the high cause of human 
improvement, must rank among the strongest means, 
vouchsafed by Divine Providence,   to hasten a period 
of universal  felicity on earth.1* 
British mercantile belief held commerce as a source of human 
improvement.     Since the Chinese also engaged heavily  in mercantile 
enterprise,   it  seemed only natural that the  two mercantile  communities 
could work  in harmony to benefit all mankind. 
Early business transactions between British and Chinese merchants 
exemplified   the spirit of "universal   felicity."    Although the abolition 
of the Canton system of trade   in 1842 extended  foreign  commerce to 
several coastal ports,  treaty stipulations made inland  travel an 
impossibility.     In order to overcome the artifical barriers to trade, 
the Shanghai merchants employed Chinese agents,  or "compradors," who 
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traveled   inland  and dealt with local merchants.       The honesty of the 
comprador was proverbial among both American and  British traders. 
Shanghai merchants   intrusted  large sums  of money  to native  traders 
to purchase tea and silk in  the  interior, and  foreigners  rarely lost 
16 
through an agent's dishonesty. 
The honesty attributed  to  the Chinese merchant also gave him 
an air of  cultural superiority.    A flood of pseudo-scientific litera- 
ture produced  in  the mid-nineteenth century lent   intellectual  support 
to racist   theories of permanent and  ineradicable differences between 
17 
European whites and darker skinned races.      All manner of negative 
characteristics were assigned  to the Chinese;   their only redeeming 
feature lay  in the extent of  their mercantile enterprise.     In this 
sense  the British classified  the Chinese as culturally superior  to 
other  "Asians" and  the Chinese    mercantile class as  superior to 
18 
their countrymen.       Thus the Chinese merchant  supposedly did not 
share  the  inherent and   incurable  failings  of other Asiatic nationalities; 
he only lacked the proper motivation and  guidance to release himself 
from the social stigma  imposed upon  the Chinese mercantile  class by 
19 
Confucian  society. 
The Shanghai  community understood  the Chinese merchant's  his- 
torical role as defined by Confucian ethic.    According to traditional 
philosophy, merchants occupied a humble social position beneath  scholars, 
farmers,  and  artisans.    As early as  the Chou dynasty  (1122-245 B.C.), 
merchants had organized guilds  for  the purpose of market control,  appren- 
ticeship and  religious devotions,   but  they had never   fought  the ruling 
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scholar bureaucrats  for an independent economic dominion.      Marketing 
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remained  strictly controlled by the government.     During the Ming 
dynasty (1368-1644),  the Chinese government had  instituted  the 
Canton system of Hong merchants,  and by the nineteenth century 
this Canton based group  composed  the  largest commercial element  in 
China.    When the Treaty of Nanking abolished the Hong system in 
1842,   its   former members  spread to other treaty ports and undertook 
21 
the role of compradors  for foreign  firms.      Although  the Chinese 
merchant's   freedom to deal with  foreign sources  increased after 1842, 
he remained  subject both  to social strictures and to a system of 
22 
governmental  controls which the British found oppressive. 
European merchants  thought  that  in  the scholar bureaucracy 
the  Shanghai  community and Chinese merchant had a common  foe.     The 
foreign merchant's   conception of his enemy was hazy;  Chinese 
"nobility"  seemed to consist of  innumerable mandarins,   a scholarly 
sect   that  controlled  localities   in much the same way sheriffs   in 
23 
medieval England  governed  shires.       British merchants  theorized  that 
the Manchu dynasty's   foreign origins made  them determined  to demon- 
strate  their mandate  to rule by strict adherence to Confucian philosophy. 
Thus Mandarins perpetuated  the Confucian ideology of "exalting agricul- 
ture and disparaging commerce" through a system of government  controlled 
24 
monopolies and   local  taxes. 
Taxes   levied on commercial   transactions provided both a major 
source of irritation  for the  foreign merchant and a common bond be- 
tween himself and  the Chinese businessman.     Both suffered  from a form 
of taxation known as  the "liken."    The  liken was a tax on goods   in 
transit,  and  on shops,   collected  on an ad valorem basis.     The Chinese 
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government   instituted  the  tax  in  1853  in a  conscious attempt  to shift 
the burden of revenue production from the agricultural   industry  to 
25 
the commercial and handicraft   industries.       Article twenty-eight  of 
the Treaty of Tientsin provided  for a customs payment of  two and one- 
half percent ad valorem;  once passed   into native hands  the  goods be- 
came subject  to liken collections  levied between the port and  the 
inland  destination.     Chinese merchants arriving from the  interior 
with goods   for exportation paid  the   liken at barriers en route;  and 
upon arrival   in Shanghai they paid a further tax,   the "Loh-ti-chuan." 
The Loh-ti-chuan was  particularly irksome  for Shanghai since  this  tax 
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did not  exist at  other ports.       Inland  tax barriers prohibited  trade, 
but they affected real estate values   in Shanghai by taxing timber and 
brick procured  from the  interior.    Approximately one-tenth of the  cost 
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of building a house in Shanghai went to "Chinese authorities." 
British merchants also saw the tax as  a tool  of Chinese officials  to 
destroy growing Chinese commerce because the   liken  tax applied  to 
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Chinese shops within the port. 
The Shanghai community did not dispute  the right  of  the Chinese 
government  to  levy taxes,  much as  they  chafed at the method of collec- 
tion.    The  traditional method of Chinese  financing set quotas  that 
provincial  officials returned to the central  government.    Any surplus 
of  funds   collected by the  local official was   in practice no concern of 
the central  government.     Liken taxes varied   from barrier to barrier 
depending on the local officials'   ability to meet  the governmental quota 
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with a measure of profit.       Payment   in excess  of ad valorem basis was 
termed a "squeeze" and  the Chinese  comprador passed on expenses  in his 
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commission.     British merchants deplored  the "squeeze" and although 
the compradors  passed  the squeeze to  them,  the Shanghai  community 
excused  their oriental  counterparts;   the  fault  lay with the Ch'ing 
bureaucracy: 
How can we expect that any deep reverence for honesty, 
truth and candor should exist in the heart of a nation 
governed  by Uriah Heeps and  Dr.   Cartwells? 
The  concept of the Ch'ing bureaucracy as a common  foe to both 
Chinese and British merchants  coupled with the  ideals of the universal 
felicity of  commercial enterprise produced a curious   image of the 
Chinese trader   in the mind of the Shanghai mercantile  community.     During 
the late  1860's  and early  1870's  the North China Herald made frequent 
reference  to  the Chinese merchant  as a type of cultural ally from whom 
important  social  changes   could be wrought   in China.     This  thesis relied 
heavily on what   British merchants perceived  to be  inherent  incompatibilities 
in the desire of most Chinese to "modernize" and  the resistance of Ch'ing 
officials  to western cultural and  commercial advancement.     British mer- 
chants believed   "the bulk of  the Chinese people wanted modernization 
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despite opposition from the mandarinate."      In  1868 an editorial   in 
the North China Herald boldly stated: 
Nine tenths of the opposition to  foreigners experienced 
in China is due to official  instigation   ... we repeat  the 
belief we have  frequently expressed  that  the people do not 
share  this dread of change, when not worked upon by the 
mandarins;  and  it  is  the wishes of the people,  not  those 
of their rulers  that we have to consult. 
References   to the  incompatibility of the desires of the populace 
and  the Ch'ing bureaucracy were  frequent during the  late sixties;  how- 
ever   it was only  in  the early 1870's  that British merchants gave more 
definite shape to  their concepts  of social revolution   in China.     The 
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refinements of  the British  image of an eventual polarization of 
Chinese  social   classes was   shown  in an article entitled  "Mandarins and 
the Masses,"  published  in  the North China Herald March 7,   1872.     British 
merchants had   long held  the  idea that   there was no western style 
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"patriotism"  in China.       The author of "Mandarins and  the Masses"  took 
this  idea one step  further and hypothesized about  the literati's re- 
sponse to a social rebellion.    Where would they  find allies   in  land 
without  "patriots"?    There was no strong ruler because  the Emperor was 
a boy of  sixteen.    The army,   the author contended, was merely a "rabble 
of unpaid desperadoes."    Furthermore  there was no caste of priests 
respected  and  trusted by the upper  classes and  "the literati would 
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shudder  to make   common cause with the mendicant Buddhists."      Thus, 
if the foreign merchant was  "careful  to show how the  interests of  the 
rank and   file of  the people are bound up with the   interests of  the 
Foreigner"   China would  be opened   to trade because of the  inability 
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of the literati   to  find  allies  to resist   foreign   influence.      Theoreti- 
cally the mercantile plan was plausible;   however  the experience of  later 
years exposed the  Shanghai merchants'   glaring misconceptions about  the 
Chinese merchant. 
Shanghai's  errors   in the assessment of the Chinese merchant 
arose  from  the narrowness  of  their perspective  and   the unreliability 
of  their sources.     G.  0.   Trevelyan remarked of British merchants   in 
India,'ho one  can  estimate very highly the moral and   intellectual 
qualities of a people among whom he resides  for  the  single purpose of 
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turning them  into pecuniary account."      Trevelyan's   statement also 
applied to  the British in China and   in a deeper sense.     Because of the 
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nature of  the  compradorial  system in China,   the European merchant  had 
much  less  contact with native merchants  than did European in India 
who dealt directly with native sources.     Shanghai merchants  relied 
upon a relatively small number of compradors to deal with Chinese 
merchants   in  the interior.     Limited contacts with native traders re- 
sulted  in a superficial knowledge of the Chinese  language and a 
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corresponding  lack of   interest   in the Chinese  culture.      What   little 
information the Shanghai merchant  gleaned  from indigenous sources 
came   from the Chinese  gazette press, which represented   little more 
than a diffusion of governmental positions. 
The gazette press consisted of newsprints  called  "hein-wen- 
chih,"   literally a "newspaper," which contained official communiques 
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released  by the  throne.       The  communiques reflected the publicity 
requirements of the imperial  throne and  the news   interests of  the 
scholar bureaucrats.     The total gazette  circulation throughout  the 
empire was   in the ten thousands and translations  appeared  in all the 
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foreign  language  newspapers.       The North China Herald dedicated at 
least a page  in  each  issue to reprints  from the "Peking Gazette" which 
issued   from the  capital  city.     The tone of the gazette  press mirrored 
traditional  Confucian philosophy and  the  low social status of the 
merchant.     The British mercantile  community was well aware of the 
shortcomings  of the "Peking Gazette" as an unbrased  source.    In  fact, 
the North China Herald  labeled  the "Gazette" as  "jejune,   untrustworthy 
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and   illegibly printed."       Nevertheless the "Gazette" was   the major 
source of information published by the Chinese government and the 
British merchants'   "most useful  source of information,  partly from what 
41 
is   to be gleaned  from it  and partly  from what it does not   contain." 
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By basing their  judgment of the Chinese merchant  on preconceptions 
maintained by isolation and  knowledge derived  from biased  sources, 
the   foreign merchants drew the erroneous  conclusion that   the native 
merchant represented an ally  in social, and   thus  commercial,   inno- 
vation   in China. 
The Shanghai merchants'   greatest mis judgment  concerned  the 
Chinese merchants'   relationship with  their government.     Because of 
their theoretically  low status,  Chinese merchants appeared  fair game 
for  talk of  social  and commercial innovation.     Indeed,   some of the 
more outspoken Chinese merchants such  as Cheng Kuan-ying openly 
questioned  the validity of  the existing social stratification which 
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placed  the merchant at the bottom.       However,  as  the Shanghai com- 
munity discovered   in the  1870's,   the   theoretically  low status of the 
Chinese merchant was misleading. 
The domestic economy  of nineteenth-century  China was highly 
developed.    Thousands of basic markets   linked   in turn to higher  level 
and  central markets  and ultimately to  the great coastal trading cities 
such as  Shanghai.     At the higher  levels  the marketing system interpene- 
trated with  the administrative hierarchy of the Ch-ing government.     By 
1865  the Chinese state and  its revenues depended on the commercial  sec- 
tor and hence  the government attempted   to insure the  latters'   survival. 
The Chinese merchant,   on the  other hand,   sought a high degree of inter- 
dependence between himself and  the official class;   commercial  success 
in the  face of  taxation and periodic special exactions depended upon 
bureaucratic connections.    The power of  the Chinese mercantile class 
did not derive  from legitimate power associated with social class,  but 
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rather   from the ability of wealth to manipulate the "prestige" posi- 
tions of society.     The power of Chinese merchants roughly paralleled 
the powers of  individuals who  controlled  organized vice  in American 
44 
cities   in the early twentieth  century. 
The Shanghai mercantile  community  failed  to recognize this 
high degree of  interpenetration between Chinese merchants and officials. 
Foreign hopes   of widening the class divisions   inherent   in Chinese 
society had no basis  in reality;  the Chinese merchant had no more 
desire to be a tool  for the introduction of western civilization than 
he wanted  to destroy the  traditional  social system that  allowed him 
to accumulate wealth and  interpenetrate with the administrative hier- 
archy of  the Ch'ing government. 
The years of domestic stability after the Taiping Revolution 
revived   the foreign trade of China.    As  the amount of trade grew 
Chinese merchants were able  to claim an ever-increasing share as  a 
result of  their  indigenous  commercial advantages.     The British mercan- 
tile  community of Shanghai was aware of the enlarged activities of the 
Chinese merchants and  far  from opposing it welcomed that activity as 
a sign of commercial progress which would open all of China to foreign 
trade.     The British  community's acceptance of the Chinese  competition 
was a part  of a general feeling of optimism that  swept  the port after 
1865.    A sense of pride in Shanghai's  institutional strength combined 
with encouraging  trade returns  to soften the blow of increased Chinese 
commercial  activity. 
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A large part  of the British merchants'   image of the Chinese 
trader during  this period centered around  the supposed differences 
between the mass of the Chinese populace and the ruling literati. 
British merchants perceived  the  literati as a major obstacle to 
free  trade with China.     British traders reasoned  that a social revo- 
lution could occur  In China if they (the British) were  careful to 
cultivate  the   commercial   instincts  of the people.     If public opinion 
went against   the  literati over  the question of "westernization" the 
British merchants hoped  the  literati would acquiesce and allow free 
trade. 
The  image of  the Chinese merchant as   an ally In the quest   for 
the commercial penetration of China was  ill-conceived.     Because of the 
extremely  limited  contacts between British and Chinese merchants 
and because of a dependence on questionable   local sources,   the 
Shanghai merchants misunderstood  the role of  the native trader  in 
Chinese society.    Although nominally at  the bottom of the Confucian 
social  scale,  nineteenth century Chinese merchants were often in 
positions of power due  to their patronage of  the literati.    Chinese 
merchants were an integral part  of the social system the  British mer- 
chants wished  to weaken.     Therefore  the native  traders hardly repre- 
sented  the potential element of social revolution envisioned by the 
British merchants.     The Chinese traders'   "social ally"   image quickly 
faced   in the 1870's.     In its place arose a much different  and  long- 
lived  concept. 
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CHAPTER  IV 
TRANSFORMATION  OF  THE CHINA TRADE   (1870-1875) 
The  first year of  the seventies marked a dramatic change   in 
the nature of the China trade.    Two developments,   the opening of the 
Suez Canal   and  the  completion of telegraphic communications between 
Shanghai and London,  altered  commercial relationships between China 
and the West.    The  immediate effect of improved  communications and 
shipment routes was an increased  flow of goods  to and  from China; 
the more subtle effects   influenced  the outlook and attitude of 
British treaty port merchants about  their role on the China coast. 
Just as  the British merchant's self-image underwent  transformation 
in the early  1870's,   the British concept  of the Chinese trader was 
altered.     By mid-decade the native  trader was  thought  of  in a very 
different context  than  in the 1860's. 
The Suez Canal officially opened  in November   1869 and during 
the  1870's China's  trade with Europe passed almost  entirely through 
the canal.    The new route reduced  the distance  from Shanghai to 
London by 24.1 percent as  compared with the old route around  the Cape 
1 
of Good Hope.     The shortened distance and the nature of the new route 
encouraged  the use of steamers  in place of sailing vessels.    Prior to 
1870, American and British merchants used  steamers  for  short-distance 
runs between  treaty ports but  the vessels were mechanically unable to 
make  longer journeys.    After  1870,   the number of steamboats   in use 
for the China trade  increased rapidly due to the canal and to general 
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2 . 
technological   improvement.      Meanwhile  telegraphic  communication be- 
tween Shanghai  and London was established in June 1871.     Branch lines 
to Hongkong,  Nagasaki,  and Vladivostok completed a world-wide hookup 
3 
by September  1871.      The general effect  of the opening of  the  canal 
and   the completion of telegraphic  communications was  an increase  in 
the speed and  certainty of  the China trade. 
The general course of foreign trade in China reflected the 
advantages  of  the  improved   transportation and   communication.    Although 
the amount  of foreign trade  fluctuated yearly during the decade, 
foreign trade   in  1880 showed an overall gain of over  twenty-six 
4 
million taels   from the total   in  1870.       Of this  foreign trade, 
Shanghai  continued  to manage the lion's  share,  due mostly to its role 
as a center   for  the re-exportation of goods from the Yangtze River 
ports.     In  spite  of the  increases  in the net total of foreign trade, 
Shanghai merchants   complained bitterly about reduced profits.    Accord- 
ing to the  customs report of  1880,   individual profit   steadily declined 
while  the total value of foreign commerce steadily increased. 
Several   factors accounted  for Shanghai's dilemma,  among which was  a 
general world-wide price depression;   reduced profits   for the Shanghai 
merchant resulted   from the  increased accessibility to the China market 
created by the Suez  Cdnal^and the  failure of the Yangtze River "out 
ports." ' 
The Suez  Canal increased direct  trade between China and Europe. 
Continental Europe had been dependent on Great  Britain  for  tea and 
silk.     But  in 1870 Russia,   the Netherlands  and  the North German Con- 
federation    began  trade with China for kerosene and silk.    While 
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Chinese  customs  totals  increased,  margins of  individual profit dropped. 
However   the blame for  lower  gains   lay not with  general depression or 
newly arrived  competition as with the old competition,  Chinese merchants. 
Shanghai's prosperity  in the  late sixties depended  to a great 
extent on the  so-called  "out-ports" on the Yangtze River.     Shanghai 
mercantile  firms  reshipped   imported goods up  the river  to branch  firms 
or "out  ports"   for sale at   increased prices.     Shanghai also  served as 
a re-export  center for the out-ports.    During the early seventies, 
customs  reports   showed a decline in  Shanghai's   import  trade and a 
6 
steady   increase   in her export  trade.    Exports   increased because Shang- 
hai's strategic position at  the mouth of the Yangtze made her an ideal 
funnel  for  the various exports   from the interior.     Shanghai's   import 
total decreased  because  the port  ceased to function in  its distribu- 
tive capacity for branch  firms.     Chinese merchants came directly to 
Shanghai  to buy  imports rather  than purchase  them at  local outlets 
for  inflated prices.     Shanghai merchants became aware of the Chinese 
movement away from the out-ports  in  the late sixties.       Increasingly 
Chinese   firms preferred  to buy direct  from Shanghai where the  selec- 
tion of goods was   larger and where  they could  benefit  from competition 
among importers  and  frequent  auctions.    The  influx of Chinese merchants 
to  Shanghai ruined   the business of  the out-ports and correspondingly 
slashed  the profits of the British merchants of   the port.    A consular 
dispatch  from Canton in  1869  succinctly described   the Chinese merchants' 
role  in  the decline of the merchant prince: 
There is no doubt that (commerce) being in Chinese hands will, 
to use the words of Lord Clarendon . . . 'tend to a larger de- 
velopment  of  trade in British goods'  and consequently what the 
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mercantile establishment may lose will be recouped tenfold to 
the home manufacturers by the increased demand.   .   .   .    There 
is  every prospect that as  far as   imports are  concerned  the 
business of Foreign  firms  in them ere  long by simply agency. 
Shanghai merchants  lost profit as a result of the failure of 
the out-ports  and because of their failure  to penetrate the   local 
Chinese market.     Compradors,   the Chinese merchants who acted as 
middlemen between  the local native merchant and  the firms at  the 
treaty ports,  became independent agents as  they learned more about 
foreign marketing practices.    As more  and more compradors became 
independent agents,   the   foreign importer lost his  only contact with 
the basic unit of  the Chinese marketing system,   the local native 
trader.     Following  the example of the  Compradors,  bureaucrats,   inland 
merchants  and  to a   lesser degree  landlords all began to  invest   in 
varying degrees   in western enterprise.     The most  successful of these 
ventures was  the Shanghai  Steam Navigation Company.    Created   in 1862 
from  funds provided  by foreign merchants and Chinese compradors,   the 
Navigation Company made a  strong bid  for the  carrying trade on the 
9 
Yangtze River. 
In addition  to growing Chinese private  enterprise,  the 
Shanghai merchant also had   to contend with activities of  the Chinese 
government.     In  the   1860's   the Chinese government adopted  the XiU- 
chiang or  "self-strengthening" policy to meet  the political and  cul- 
tural   threats of Western encroachments.     The philosophy of  the  tzu- 
chiang movement progressed   from the idea of using Western arms   to 
fight  the   foreigners   in 1861  to the realization by  1870 that the 
Chinese must produce Western arms  in China and  that  the Chinese must 
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be   trained  in Western sciences  in general. Part of the tzu-chiang 
policy was a policy of "official supervision and merchant management" 
(Kuan-tu-shang-pan).    According to this theory,   the Chinese  government 
exercised the  initiative and  supervision while private businessmen 
11 
supplied  capital  and management.       Between  1870 and  1890,  the Chinese 
government and  local merchants   instituted about a dozen enterprises, 
mostly arsenals and dockyards.     The China Merchants'  Steam Navigation 
Company,  a Chinese  enterprise  supported by government officials and 
managed by former  compradores, was  the most  successful result  of the 
12 
"Kuan-tu-shang-pan" policy. The China Merchants'   Steam Navigation 
Company and  the  Shanghai Steam Navigation Company provided the  first 
competition  for  the American-owned Russel and Company line, which 
13 
until   1872 had  a virtual monopoly on the Yangtze River steam traffic. 
Until   1876  the results  of the "self-strengthening" policy in 
the areas of industrialization and commerce were  few;  the Kiangnan 
Arsenal at Shanghai and the Nanking Arsenal were completed by  1867, 
a machine  factory in Tientsin was enlarged  in  1870,  and  the China 
Merchants  Steam Navigation Company was organized  in  1872.     Because 
of the slowness  of Chinese authorities  to implement   the "self- 
strengthening" policy,   it had   little effect on the  course of China's 
foreign  trade before   1880.     British firms gained very  little by supply- 
ing raw materials on mechanical parts  to the Chinese because of the 
small amount of  industrial activity and because  in certain areas of 
enterprise,   such as  steamship  construction,   the Chinese were almost 
aelE-sufflclent.     As  early as   1868 Chinese shipbuilders had constructed 
lft 
a steamship  from parts made almost entirely on Chinese soil.      After 
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1880 China's   industrialization effort grew by  leaps and bounds;   at 
that  time foreign   trade  in raw materials and mechanical parts became 
profitable.     However during the  1870's the major effect of the Kuan- 
tu-shang-pan policy on foreign trade was a loss of revenue  for British 
and American  firms  as a result of new competition for the Yangtze River 
steamship trade. 
The sudden shortening of distance between China and Europe and 
the  increased   Chinese competition affected more   than the Shanghai 
merchant's profits.     These  changes  affected the very nature of his 
business  transactions and   in turn altered his self image and his 
image of the Chinese merchant.     During the  first years of the 
seventies,   the  ideal of the "merchant prince"  faded  into obscurity, 
crushed by the realities  of a maturing market. 
Prior to the opening of the Suez Canal and  telegraphic communi- 
cations,   the merchant  prince maintained his status because of remote- 
ness  from the   field of European  trade.     He possessed considerable 
stocks of goods at all times,   bought  Chinese and  European goods out- 
right,  and made  great  gains   if fortune  smiled on him.    He acted on 
his own initiative and enjoyed  a great amount of  freedom to transact 
business as he  saw fit.     The  telegraph and steamer brought this 
blissful state  to an end.     Closer contacts with Europe steadily reduced 
the "merchant prince"   to an agent,  strictly accountable for his trans- 
actions and dependent  on orders   from his home  firm in the west. 
The effects of  the Shanghai merchants'   loss of status and his 
corresponding loss of profit  are difficult  to define.    Nevertheless 
the change  in mercantile attitude toward his government and toward 
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the character of Chinese  foreign trade after  1870 was  in sharp con- 
trast  to British mercantile attitude  in the   late 1860's.    British 
merchants   swifly abandoned the  idea of a peaceful  commercial pene- 
tration of  the China market and demanded that  the Foreign Office 
wring concessions,   by force if necessary,   from the Chinese govern- 
ment.     The  Shanghai merchants'   reaction to his  jeopardized status 
included  a hardening of the rhetoric directed at the Foreign Office's 
China policy and a redefinition of attitudes  towards  the Chinese 
merchant.     The merchants'  outlook shifted from conciliation of the 
home government to attacks upon  the Co-operative policy.     In Shanghai 
British merchants  changed   in attitude toward  the Chinese merchant 
primarily  in  their assessment of ethical character;  Shanghai merchants 
clung to  the  concept  of  the Chinese merchant as their only commercial 
ally. 
Shanghai merchants   found ample ammunition for  their attacks 
on British  foreign policy between 1870 and 1875.    The   focal point 
of mercantile  criticism was  the attempt of the Foreign Office to 
attain  equal diplomatic status  for China.    The Shanghai community 
had not  opposed  the principle of bargaining with China  in 1869 and 
in fact voted  a qualified acceptance of the Alcock Convention. 
However,   their tune changed  in the  seventies.    Anti-foreign and 
anti-missionary demonstrations culminated  in the massacre of Roman 
Catholic nuns of the Order St.  Vincent de Paul and the  French consul 
16 
at Tientsin  in  1870. The Tientsin massacre provided an opportunity 
to force a change in British policy;  here was proof that   the Co-opera- 
tive Policy would never work: 
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One political advantage has  followed from the Tientsin 
massacre.     It has shown the  foreign powers that  the 
Chinese are  barely a semi-civilized people;  that foreigners 
residing among them are more or  less insecure and need ever 
active protection  .   .   A7 
Mercantile philosophy refuted any notion that the Chinese 
could be dealt with as equals;   the North China Herald bluntly stated, 
"One does not argue with children;  one reflects on what  is best and 
18 
desires  them to conform."       In the mercantile mind what was best  for 
the Chinese was  also best   for the Shanghai merchant:     abolition of 
inland taxes,   the opening of the  interior to trade,  and the extension 
of extraterritoriality.     The abolition of inland taxes and the exten- 
sion of extraterritoriality were  consistent with mercantile demands 
from prior decades.     However,  the question of opening the interior 
underwent a subtle transformation.    In the sixties,   Shanghai merchants 
did not  press  for the opening of additional  treaty ports.    Overexpan- 
sion,  in  the  form of numerous  treaty ports,   caused  serious business 
losses.     "Experience has  shown the opening of new ports to be far 
less advantageous  than ever  thought," warned   the North China Herald 
in  1867.     "The tendency of  foreign trade  is to centralize in Shanghai." 
By  1872,   profits dropped to  the point that the Shanghai merchants urged 
any gamble to  improve the general  trade,   even the opening of new ports 
The North China Herald suggested "trading in"  two or  three of the 
existing treaty ports  to obtain new concessions  further inland on 
21 
the Yangtze River. 
The desperate wish of the Shanghai merchant to restore the  lost 
myth of an era of profitable  trade  led him to attack the policies of 
his  government.     For the foreign merchant   in China,   the British 
19 
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government's decision  to  follow the co-operative policy infringed 
on his rights  to  free trade and right  to high profit and eventually 
altered his perceptions of the China trade.    The  introduction of 
the telegraph and   the opening of the Suez Canal ended  the possi- 
bilities of quick  fortune  through speculation.    Due to the opening 
of the Canal,   British produce arrived at  the treaty ports at 
accelerated  rates while distribution over  the interior was as 
difficult as  ever and  the  internal market remained untapped.     This 
overtrading resulted in smaller profits.    As  if this state of affairs 
were not  enough of a blow to  the  former "merchant prince," he had  to 
watch  trade pass  into native hands while he was reduced  to the status 
of a commission agent.     British mercantile reaction to the growing 
ascendency of  the Chinese  trader was quick to follow the same path 
as their response to British  foreign policy regarding China. 
British   images  of  the  Chinese merchant   in the  first years of 
the  1870's  did not reflect   the degree of change in the nature of the 
China  trade.     Although the role of the British merchant   changed,   his 
perceptions of  the China market remained  basically unaltered.     The 
myths of a  commercial   "El Dorado" persisted along with the beliefs 
that   the policies of the Foreign Office and  the exclusiveness of 
the Ch'ing bureaucracy were  the major obstacles to profitable trade. 
However,   the  loss of prestige associated with his former "merchant 
prince"  status  and the  fear  that   the  imagined halycon days of the 
China trade had  ended  subtly  influenced  the British merchants' 
images of the Chinese   trader. 
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The British merchants  of  the 1870's held seemingly contra- 
dictory images  of the Chinese merchant.     On the one hand,   British 
merchants welcomed the emergence of Chinese mercantile enterprise. 
Treaty port residents believed that  the extension of commercial 
spirit would weaken the age-old barriers of Chinese exclusiveness. 
On the other hand,  British merchants were faced with the urgent 
reality that  the  imagined quick returns  and profitable employment 
of capital had not materialized.    Moreover,  Chinese  competition was 
taking the   lion's  share of the meager profitable enterprise.    Because 
of these pressures,   the British concept of the  Chinese merchant began 
a slow movement  away from the positive  image of  the early 1860's  and 
began to assume a different  form. 
British mercantile reaction to the ever-increasing problem of 
Chinese competition always rested on the assumption of the  innate 
superiority of western mercantile spirit and technique.     Foreign 
merchants recognized their Chinese  counterparts  as shrewd and  capable 
businessmen with an extraordinary capacity for absorbing the finer 
22 
points of mercantile transactions.       European traders admired the 
excellent utilization of the native merchants'   "natural" advantages 
23 
of greater economy,  better information and guild protection.       But 
however  great  the  Chinese merchant's aptitude  for  commercial  endeavor, 
foreign merchants argued  that his gains stemmed  from conditions 
created by western enterprise.    The Shanghai merchants reasoned  that 
Chinese success  in  the  late sixties and early seventies resulted  from 
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their own  inability to travel inland  for direct business  contact, 
but once   the Western merchant gained access  to the  interior Chinese 
merchants   in the hinterland provinces would be as dependent  on foreign 
enterprise  and skill as  the Chinese  coastal merchants were in the 
24 
matter of   transport  to and   from Europe.       Chinese merchants needed 
the well-arranged system of commercial  law provided by the presence 
of western  enterprise.     Foreigners noted a  conspicuous  lack of legal 
25 
aptitude  in  the Chinese mind.      Thus  foreign merchants  judged  the 
Chinese banking system insufficiently developed to  cover  financial 
obligations,   considered Chinese corporate and bankruptcy laws "crude," 
and believed   the Chinese  language  too restrictive  to "lend  itself 
26 
readily to new ideas."       Despite his apparent  commercial  failures, 
the Shanghai merchant viewed himself as an indispensable element in 
China's entrance  into  international  commerce.     Without  foreign 
guidance,   (the North China Herald  surmised),   the Celestial Empire 
would never  attain a respectable position among the nations of the 
earth,   — "nor can it be denied that  the Chinese, however bigoted 
they may be,   have shewn a very keen appreciation of the value of 
27 
European aid." 
Mercantile belief in the incompatibility of the two extremes 
of the Chinese  social spectrum,  the mandarin and the merchant,  re- 
mained as unshaken as  their belief in the     -periority of western 
commerce.     Despite governmental participation  in industrialization 
efforts  such as mining and  the steamship carrying trade,   Shanghai 
I 
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merchants   clung to the  hope of eventual open conflict between the 
two classes.    Western merchants focused their attention on the ques- 
tion of inland taxes,  since they represented a common complaint of 
both foreign and native traders.     In 1874 the North China Herald 
reprinted a memorial from Chinese merchants to the  local  customs 
official which complained of the multiplicity of tax barriers  and 
the heaviness  of the dues  collected.    The memorial  concluded,   "As 
a result  fifty to sixty merchants are already bankrupt and the rest 
28 
are daily sinking  lower."      In 1876,   the same newspaper reported  two 
occasions of "flat rebellion" by Chinese merchants against "the ex- 
29 
cessive demands of their mandarins." 
As unmistakable desire for commercial enterprise touched  the 
mandarins,   as   evidenced by the China Merchants'  Steam Navigation Com- 
pany,   the  foreign merchant began to modify his  ideas  of the Chinese 
ruling class.     By the seventies,   the Shanghai merchant struck on the 
idea that Chinese bureaucrats aimed  their policies against missionary 
activities and not   trade.     European merchants  felt  the propagation of 
Christianity was China's  chief objection to foreigners because mis- 
sionary activities  threatened the ideological basis of Confucianism. 
Other Chinese objections to foreign intrusion seemed negotiable except 
opium;  as Prince Rung noted  in a discussion with Rutherford Alcock: 
"   .   .   .if,  you  could only relieve us of missionaries and opium,   there 
31 
need be no more  trouble  in China."        The possibility of Chinese man- 
darins allowing more open trading conditions added a new dimension to 
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foreign merchants'  conception of the Chinese bureaucracy.    The despair 
of earlier decades over swaying the ruling class  to accept cultural 
change faded somewhat and   in  its place flickered the dream of reconcili- 
ation and open  trade. 
As the seventies progressed,  unsatisfactory trade and the eclipse 
of the merchant prince  ideal  influenced the Shanghai merchants'   concep- 
tion of  the native traders.    Growing elements of distrust and fear 
grafted themselves onto the basic assumptions of Chinese character 
carried over  from the days of the Canton trade.    The Shanghai merchants 
of the seventies,   second and third generation traders,  based their 
attitudes more on fluctuating commercial affairs and  their Jeopardized 
position as  China's  commercial managers  than on the racial precon- 
ceptions of their predecessors.    These changes did not represent an 
overt  shifting of stance,   but did reflect the Shanghai merchants'   in- 
creasing sense of insecurity as to their  future on the China coast. 
As new generations  of European merchants operated under the 
steadily evolving commercial  conditions at Shanghai,   a new concept of 
Chinese mercantile  character developed.     In the earlier days of the 
Canton trade,   the honesty and efficiency of the comprador was renowned 
among foreign traders.    However,  as more and more Chinese merchants 
participated   in foreign trade,   their reputation for honesty among  for- 
eigners declined  sharply.     Disputes between Chinese and  foreign 
merchants arose  from the absconding of compradors and   flooded the 
dockets of the Mixed Court after  the sixties.    More often than not, 
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the Chinese merchants won their suits and  foreigners complained bitterly 
about  the  failure of the Mixed Court  to function "satisfactorily" be- 
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cause of  the inherent dishonesty of the Chinese.       Foreigners believed 
that the  increased number of agents employed in transactions which 
before had   involved  only a small number accounted  for the rise  in court 
cases.    Moreover,   Shanghai's  location put Shanghai merchants in contact 
with the  least  "admirable" of all Chinese: 
Like the natives  of Bengal,  the inhabitants of Kiangsu lack 
force and energy to a remarkable degree, and show the natural 
lethargy and deceitfulness of the native mind to a greater  ex- 
tent  than any others.    And the Cantonese, whom we use as ser- 
vants  in their stead,  are the most vicious and insolent,   if 
the moat   intelligent of the Provincials. 
Foreign merchants  in the early days  of the Canton trade took 
pride  in  their friendship with Chinese compradors,  but by seventies 
one merchant  observed, 
The Chinese merchant  is   in  fact a man of neither 
education or refinement,   and no English gentleman 
would  condescend  to associate with him in terms of 
friendship and equality.34 
It  is  clear that  the change  in the Chinese character  took 
place  in the mind of  the  foreign merchant  and not among the Chinese 
themselves.     British merchants on the China coast reflected racial 
attitudes  common among traders and colonizers  in other sections of 
Asia.    The  isolation of the treaty port,   combined with the  intimate 
and public nature of life within it  fostered  sentiments of nationalism, 
racism,  and worship of material progress and force that characterized 
the Victorian age.    A very important part  of the nineteenth century 
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Englishman's outlook involved the so-called "cult of good or gentle- 
manly conduct."       For the majority of Englishmen in Shanghai  the 
"cult of conduct" meant little more than a sense of hard work and 
sportsmanlike play  forming a solid character and will.     Despite the 
vagueness of the "cult of  conduct," it deeply influenced the Shanghai 
merchants'  attitude  toward   the Chinese  competition. 
British merchants came to China with the idea of making their 
fortunes  and returning to England as soon as possible.     "Commerce," 
a Shanghai resident  observed, "was the beginning,   the middle and the 
36 
end of our  life  in China."       Making your fortune  in Shanghai required 
hard work and  hard play.    Next to business,  relaxation,   in the  form 
of sporting games, played  the largest part in a Shanghai  trader's 
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life.       Shanghai was   like a huge men's  club,  or as  the North China 
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Herald put   it,   a "Paradise of Muscular Christians": 
What we wanted and what we got was exercise of the most 
violent kind,   fives, rackets,   rowing or riding;  some- 
thing, to use the  current  phrase,   to   'shake up your 
livers.'  39 
The  desire  for  strenuous exercise was as much a part of the 
cult of conduct  as hard work.     The  value of sports was in  its train- 
ing for  leadership;   lessons   in proper conduct  came as much from the 
sporting fields  as  from the  classroom or business ventures.    The 
emphasis on  sport  in Shanghai  as a source of training led participants 
to draw negative  conclusions  about  those  less  inclined  to "shake up 
their  liver": 
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... we used  to actually despise  those men who took their 
only exercise   in the shape of a mild walk of three or four 
miles,   followed by a game,of American bowls.    We  thought 
them milksops or duffers. 
When the standards of  the "cult of conduct" were applied to 
the Chinese in  the  early years of trade,   native merchants measured 
up well  because of their honesty in business  transactions.     However, 
by the seventies,   the Chinese merchant's dishonesty was  as well- 
known a "fact"  as his earlier reputation   for probity.     Furthermore, 
native  lack of   interest  in exercise or team sport reinforced  the 
European  concept of negative Chinese  characteristics.     "Belong 
foreign man custom they (the Chinese)  would  say as  they turned to 
their diet  of rice and  cabbages," reported a disgusted  Shanghai 
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resident.       The   change in British attitudes  towards  the Chinese 
merchant resulted  from the   increased pressures on the Shanghai 
resident   to maintain his economic and  social status.     Technological 
change,   lower profit margins,   and  increased Chinese  competition all 
threatened  the   foreign merchants'   self assurance. 
Mercantile attempts  to  justify this dislike  for Chinese  competi- 
tion resulted in  the perception of imagined  threats.    When Chinese 
peasants massacred several French priests and sisters  in Tientsin, 
the Shanghai mercantile community interpreted the event as a Chinese 
42 
"conspiracy."      Articles recounting the supposed atrocities of  the 
incident  filled  the pages of  the North China Herald  for months after 
the occurrence.     Shanghai residents   felt  that  Che  Chinese would soon 
mass and move against   them and  so  frenzied plans were concocted to 
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fortify the city. Articles analyzing Chinese characteristics   in- 
creased and such essays  as "Chinese Canabalism" accompanied  the 
regular stories of atrocity and the necessity  to fortify the city. 
As negotiations  between French and Chinese officials  concluded,   the 
fear of  imminent  attack subsided within  the port;   however,   Shanghai's 
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paranoia resurfaced   from time  to time during the seventies. 
As   the status of the Shanghai merchant declined, he  turned   in- 
creasingly to emotional arguments  to defend his position on the China 
coast.    An evolution  in British  thinking took place in regard to  those 
Chinese characteristics which clashed with the Victorian code of con- 
duct.     Concepts of  inherent dishonesty and fear of conspiracy gradually 
crept  into British perceptions  of  the Chinese merchant.    The  change  in 
British attitude was well  illustrated by  the North China Herald's re- 
sponse to a memorandum issued by Robert Hart,   inspector general of  the 
Maritime Customs.     In  1875 Hart predicted: 
.   .   .   the  competition coming from the Chinese side,   in ten 
or  twenty years   time, will have swept  the  foreign flag from 
the coasting trade of China and displayed the Chinese colours 
in the London and Liverpool docks. 
Had  Hart made this statement  in  1865,  the British community 
surely would have replied with a defense  of European  institutions. 
However, when in  1875,   the North China Herald replied  to Mr.   Hart   in 
a series of articles,   their  first  argument began,   "Is Mr.  Hart prepared 
to assert  that  the Chinese are a superior race to his own countrymen?" 
While the domestic trade was   lost   to the  Chinese,   the newspaper argued, 
"the superior  intelligence,   honesty,  and  capacity  for organization of 
foreigners will enable them to hold the carrying trade to and   from China." 
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Improved  communications and  increased competition  in the early 
seventies drastically changed  the nature of foreign enterprise in 
China.    The China trade  lost   its  glamour and promise of wealth,  basis 
of the short-term opportunism of the British.    Accompanying the demise 
of  the old style  of  trade there arose negative perceptiois of Chinese 
.nercantile character.    These   images of untrustworthiness, deceit,   and 
double-dealing did not  shatter  the foreigner's concept  of  the Chinese 
merchant as a potential ally  for social  innovation,  but did reflect 
the British merchants'   growing awareness of  the fallicies of his 
myths about the China trade.     As   the realities of an unprofitable 
China market appeared with increased rapidity British merchants  looked 
about   for a scapegoat.     The   late  1870's would witness a hardening of 
rhetoric against  the  Chinese merchant  that endured  until  the end of 
the  century. 
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CHAPTER  V 
"JOHN  COMPRADOR":     THE YELLOW PERIL 
During the  last   five years of  the  1870's,   foreign merchants in 
China referred  to  the  condition of trade solely  in terms of "depres- 
sion" or "stagnation."     In light of yearly trade returns, which showed 
an average  increase of  five million  taels over returns   from 1870 to 
1 
1875, mercantile rhetoric seems  unwarranted.       However,  a depressed 
state of commerce did exist,   if only in the mind of  the  Shanghai 
merchant: 
The present  generation of residents can hardly believe  that 
the heavy and depressed  groups of Anglo-Saxons who now gather 
mournfully round  the Club Bar,  or take  long silent walks  toward 
Woosung,  were ever animated,   jovial  fellows,   full of  fun and keen 
on a practical   joke.* 
Commercial and diplomatic developments  in the  late seventies 
provided   little reason  for exuberance.     The Chefoo Convention,  a re- 
vision of the  treaty of  1858,  opened new ports on  the Yangtze River 
in September  of  1876.     Shanghai merchants, mindful of the beneficial 
effects of  the  first Yangtze Ports,   assumed  the new ports would re- 
3 
vitalize  trade.       Just as with previous  business  ventures   the new out- 
ports  fell,   as  the North China Herald  so aptly surmised,   "remarkably 
4 
flat"    by the next year.    As   the realities of declining trade became 
more apparent  the Shanghai merchants  searched  for  other  Bourcoa of ii.- 
come.    The Shanghai mercantile  community made efforts in thj 
to establish  themselves  in mining, railroad construction and shipping, 
all to little or no avail. 
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The British   in Shanghai  showed a keen interest in mining, 
especially  for  coal.    While negotiating with the Chinese for rights 
to mine,   the merchants organized highly publicized explorations  for 
mineral deposits.       To their disappointment,   the Chinese governments 
6 
refused  to grant mining rights to foreign firms in the seventies. 
Undeterred by their  failure  in the  field of mining,  British merchants 
turned to railroads  as a potential  source of income.     Under the auspices 
of Jardine,  Matheson and Company one of the  foremost  foreign  firms in 
China, a  four-mile railroad was  completed   in 1876 between Shanghai and 
7 
Kangwan.    The  train unfortunately,  at  least from the mercantile point 
of view,  ran down a Chinese  boy.     Confronted with mob violence,   the 
firm sold  the   line  to  the Chinese government, which in turn dismantled 
8 
it and shipped  the pieces  to Formosa.       Furthermore,   in 1877,   the 
British watched as  the Shanghai Steam Navigation Company,  the first 
foreign shipping company in China and once  the dominant  firm in Yangtze 
shipping,   sold out  to  the  Chinese-owned China Merchant's Steam Naviga- 
9 
tion Company.       Jardine, Matheson and Company founded  the Indo-China 
Steam Navigation Company in  1875;  however,   it  too was partially funded 
10 
by Chinese  comprador-merchants.       In every direction the Shanghai mer- 
chant  found himself thwarted  either by the Chinese government or by 
every-increasing Chinese mercantile competition. 
By the late seventies,   the Chinese merchants controlled almost 
half the local   trade between ports on the  coast of China and ports   in 
11 
neighboring countries  such as Siam,  Singapore,   and Batavia.      The Chefoo 
Convention of 1876 relieved  the pressure of the liken tax to some extent, 
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and allowed  foreign merchants   to focus  their attention on more basic 
12 
causes  for their  commercial  failure and  Chinese commercial success. 
As the liken tax had represented   the most  specific obstacle to 
foreign trade   in the early seventies,   the Chinese guild now appeared 
as the major roadblock.     Foreign merchants were by their own admission 
painfully ignorant of the working of native guilds.    According to 
British merchants  the guilds  exercised arbitrary influence over 
native merchants  and  in some cases seemed  to control  the activities 
of Chinese authorities.     The difficulty with  the Chinese guilds was 
13 
"to get hold of anything tangible" concerning their activities. 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of guild operations  foreign 
firms began to stress the ability "to talk to the Chinese";   one 
American   firm even toyed with  the  idea of requiring employees to  learn 
14 
Chinese at  their  own expense. 
The  commercial and diplomatic failures of the  late seventies 
crushed the  spirit  of the mercantile community.    Poor trade returns, 
lack of personal  interest  in trade because of their status as mere 
agents, and  the  inability  to expand into other  commercial and  indus- 
trial fields made  British merchants  introspective.    While this period 
produced  some positive results,   such as awareness of the necessity to 
learn Chinese,   it  also generated  negative concepts based on feelings 
of isolation,   loss of self-esteem and betrayal of the Victorian code 
of conduct.     Shanghai merchants   came to question  the basic perceptions 
of their community and of the Chinese merchant which they had held  since 
the  time of  the Canton  trade. 
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Some  time after 1875 the North China Herald began to run 
articles analyzing the depressed state of affairs  in Shanghai.    The 
usual criticisms  about Chinese mandarins,  restrictions of inland trade, 
and taxes were  leveled at no one in particular; however, a new element 
crept  into mercantile attacks.     Instead of blasting unresponsive and 
sometimes unidentified   institutions or pressure groups,   the Shanghai 
merchants began to review their management of the China trade and 
Shanghai's  cultural  and  commercial role.    The difficult years of the 
late seventies exploded  the myth of Shanghai as the "model settlement." 
The death of  the  idea of  the "free city," an oasis of culture and 
energy located   in the midst of Chinese conservatism and  lethargy, 
followed  the demise of the merchant prince ideal.     Editorials and 
articles published   in the North China Herald after  1875 have a dis- 
tinctively defeatist  attitude absent  from writings of earlier years. 
In 1878,   two articles  appeared  in the  columns of the newspaper which 
reflected the  changed outlooks of the Shanghai residents.     In August, 
an article entitled   "Shanghaism"  attacked  the "myths" associated with 
living in Shanghai,   such as "expanded  sympathies,   enlarged views and 
15 
freedom from prejudice." The article continued: 
Most of us are here not because we like it,  but because we 
cannot get  home  .   .   .    When we returned, we found ourselves 
unsulted  to altered home surroundings   ...     (We display)   a 
tendency to avoid  the society of cultivated and well-bred women, 
and a habit  of consuming alcohol at abnormal hours.   .   .   .In 
a word   'Shanghaism'   is  an offensive form of Philistinism. 
This attitude was  a far cry from the civic pride and  cultural 
airs displayed by the  Shanghai merchant prince in 1865.    Merchants of 
i 
69 
earlier years were not  given to self-criticism because of their cer- 
tainty of  their role  in the China trade.    Nor were earlier merchants 
nostalgic;   in August of 1878 the North China Herald published an essay 
17 
entitled  "Three  Epochs   in the History of Shanghai."      The article 
largely ignored  the technological  innovations that characterized  the 
transitional state of the China trade  in the seventies.     Instead,   the 
report divided  the history of Shanghai into three epochs reflecting 
three classes of men.    The early dwellers saw Shanghai as  a "city akin 
to that which rises  on  the banks of the Hooghly."    These  first in- 
habitants   inherited a "profound respect  for the policy which had given 
India to Great Britain."    The second era saw an influx of a variety of 
people.    The increased "foreign population" resulted  in "growing 
license and  coarser tone"   in public affairs.    The article continued, 
"the prominent men at  this  transitional period in our social history 
18 
were  characterless or  lax."      The  final epoch in Shanghai's history, 
which as of  1878 had not yet unfolded,  involved the Chinese crowding 
the  foreigners out  into the suburbs.    The author was not  specific in 
his description of  the  coining events,  but warned,  "A settlement^crammed 
with  live Chinese means a cemetery  filled with dead Europeans." 
These  two articles,   "Shanghaism" and "Three Epochs  in the History 
of Shanghai," reflect  the  tone of the mercantile community in the late 
seventies.    That which bordered on cultural pretentiousness in 1865 was 
by 1880 transformed  to condescension tinged with a genuine fear of 
Chinese competition.     In the sixties and early seventies,   the mercantile 
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community feared  violent mob action  from Chinese peasants;   in the late 
seventies,  European merchants   feared an influx of Chinese  traders. 
Mob or merchant,   the result would be the same:     either death from 
physical violence  or slow commercial  strangulation. 
The North China Herald provided another perspective on mercan- 
tile depression  in  the  late   seventies.    The newspaper began to publish 
increased numbers  of articles pertaining to China in the home press. 
These articles, which ranged   from reviews of current literature to 
verbal attacks on authors,  stressed  a single theme:     in regard to the 
Far East  in general and to China in particular,   "the apathy and ignor- 
20 
ance displayed  is   something astounding."      In the late seventies,  The 
Fortnightly Review,   the Saturday Review,  the Pall Mall Gazette,   the 
Spectator and the Examiner,   all "more or less" turned to Chinese matters. 
British merchants,   although pleased with the spirit of interest  in 
China,  severely criticized works that   in their mind had a "tendency 
22 
to mislead."      The Fortnightly Review took the lead  in producing 
"misleading" articles.     Rutherford Alcock,  a former consul at Shanghai 
and one of the architects of the cooperative policy,   contributed articles 
23 
in 1876 which raised mercantile  ire.       Two articles,  "Is Our Cause in 
24 
China Just" by J. H.   Bridges,       and "The Present State of China" by 
25 , , 
Herbert Giles    not  only defended Foreign Office policy, but also openly 
attacked mercantile demands  for  treaty revision.     These articles and 
others  from sources  as respectable as The Times  caused persistent agita- 
26 
tion in the mercantile community.      Fictional and philosophical worns 
21 
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also drew fire  from the North China Herald.     The Shanghai newspaper 
27 28 
criticized both Charles  Dickens and Voltaire     for inaccurate por- 
trayals of China and of  foreign merchants  in the treaty ports. 
The  increased sensitivity of the Shanghai mercantile com- 
munity to its  image in the home press was  symptomatic of the psycho- 
logical depression which gripped  the port in  the  late seventies.    A 
sudden concern for  the  foreign merchant as a misunderstood and under- 
valued element  in  English  society overpowered  the Shanghai trader and 
contributed  significantly  to his overall perspectives.    The China 
trade,  always plagued by enemies  such as  the Foreign Office and 
Chinese officials,   found new adversaries.    The North China Herald, 
formerly given  to  trade reports and  sporting news,  began careful 
scrutiny of the  causes of mercantile stagnation.    Added to the stan- 
29 30 
dard bugaboos were  the home press,    women,      and the Chinese merchant. 
In the British merchant's   frantic search  for an identifiable  foe, he 
belatedly stumbled  upon a major source of his difficulties,   the native 
trader. 
The concept  of the  Chinese merchant as an ally for social reform 
had not died by the  seventies.    Although Chinese commercial success  shook 
the British traders'   belief  in their ultimate  compatibility,  native 
31 
merchants  still  represented  a "frugal and hardworking middle  class" 
from which social reforms would ultimately flow.     Just as Chinese 
merchants remained an ally,   Chinese officials persisted in their role 
of obstruction to progress: 
I 
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. . . there are hundreds of intelligent men in China 
possessed of large wealth. This money they are only 
too eager to employ in mines, telegraphs, and in all 
public works which would enrich them and benefit the 
country, but they are absolutely obliged to hide their 
wealth and pretend to be poor, lest the mandarins should 
rob them of every  last  cash  .   .   . 
The Shanghai merchants' hatred   for Chinese mandarins  led them 
to draw seemingly  illogical   conclusions about Asian racial character- 
istics.    While  the Chinese represented the apex of Asian racial groups, 
mandarins, who provided   the  leadership to this  elite ethnic group, 
were somehow inferior to the  upper  classes of other countries.    In 
1877,  the North China Herald reported: 
That   the Chinaman has more energy and perhaps more 
force of mind  than a Bengalee  is probably true  .   .   . 
But even if we  grant  the  superiority of the average 
or lower class   Chinaman to the Indian, we question 
very much whether the  comparison holds good among 
the upper  classes.    Pit Sundiah,   for instance against 
Li-Hung-Chang,   or try to  find a Chinaman to be named  in 
the same day with Rama Persad l|oy,  erst member of the 
Legislative Council of Bengal. 
Mandarin  involvement  in supposed attempts   to destroy foreign 
trade closed the mercantile mind to all sentiments but hatred and con- 
tempt.    British merchants  believed the Chinese  government retained all 
private enterprise under its   control.     "By fighting British mercantilism 
with its  own weapons,"  foreign merchants  contended, Chinese mandarins 
were involved  in a "scheme   for driving off foreign trade  from the 
34 
coast."       British obsession with the supposed mandarin conspiracy 
blinded them to  the realities  of native mercantile-bureaucratic ties. 
However,   events  in 1879 revealed to the  foreign merchants the nature 
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and  the extent of that relationship;   a case heard before the Shanghai 
Mixed Court,   C.J.W. Duff and  D.M.  David vs.  Swatow Opium Guild,  con- 
firmed the  suspicions of foreign merchants about their Chinese counter- 
parts. 
Duff and David were British merchants operating from the out- 
port of Chinkiang,  about one hundred  fifty miles  from Shanghai on 
the Yangtze River.    The  two   foreign merchants charged "Conspiracy 
Against Foreign Trade" against  the so-called Swatow Opium Guild in 
September,   1879.     Because of irregularly applied  inland taxes,  Swatow 
arose in the early seventies  as  the major depot for opium traffic in 
35 
the Kiangsi district.       Duff and David maintained the irregular appli- 
cation of taxes   that allowed  Swatow to grow resulted  from mandarin 
connivance with local native merchants.    The foreigners charged that 
local officials allowed  the Swatow Opium Guild to collect  liken in 
order to drive   competition out of business;  "It has been stated,  and 
it has not been denied," Duff testified,   "that in Shanghai and Chinkiang, 
at all events,   if not at other places,   the relations between the Swatow 
36 
Guild and  the  officials are of the highest nature."      The Guild,   in the 
British estimation,  re-instituted the  late Co-Hong at Canton which had 
been outlawed   in  the Nanking Treaty of 1842. 
The Shanghai Mixed Court dismissed the case.    Foreign merchants 
were unable  to  rally the Chamber of Commerce to their aid because the 
case involved  opium trade.     Duff and David warned "what today is 
possible with regard to opium,   tomorrow may be imposed on other staples;" 
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however the mercantile  community remained reluctant to publicize their 
opium trade.    Although foreign merchants  lost the case in court,  they 
gained a measure of certainty about what before had been only specula- 
tion.    Even before the   completion of the hearing,   the North China 
Herald reported: 
Although most of the merchants of Shanghai were aware 
that  some hidden measures were being carried on,   few, 
until  this  exposure,   had any  idea of the extent to 
which  foreign commerce was being tampered with.38 
The revelation in court' hearings that the Chinese mercantile 
class and  the mandarins actually worked in profitable harmony destroyed 
British notions of polarization of social  classes.    The Chinese mer- 
chants no longer seemed  commercial brethren but rather became enemies 
to overcome  in the  struggle  for a profitable China trade.    The cul- 
tural distinctions  conferred by commercial enterprise,   such as inte- 
grity,  aggressiveness and  intelligence,  suddenly disappeared  from 
British perceptions of the Chinese merchant.    Native traders sank to 
the level of all other "Asians" and worse, now seemed to pose a threat 
to Britain's dominance  in Asian commerce.    This change  in attitude 
developed during the seventies;   the Swatow Opium Guild case provided 
the focal point   for mercantile apprehensions and moreover,  gave a sem- 
1       39 blance of proof  for the Shanghai merchants*  accusations. 
The image  of the Chinese merchant as a commercial and cultural 
enemy chronologically parallels negative  images of Chinese labor in the 
western United States.    Connections between Chinese  commercial competi- 
tion in Asia and Chinese  labor competition in the llbltad  States are 
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difficult to discern,  but one fact  is evident:    both produced unwar- 
ranted  fears of Oriental  influence.    The two areas of economic pene- 
tration,  although separated by manner of endeavor and geographic dis- 
tance, produced  strikingly similar reactions  from British and American 
sources.    In 1880,   two  fictional accounts of a Chinese plot to control 
the world appeared  in the Overland Monthly,  a San Francisco periodical 
closely attuned to the  cultural tensions  in the late seventies.    Much 
the same message surfaced  in a British periodical, Punch.    A satirical 
poem,  "Paterfamilias on Pigtails," contained warnings of Chinese expan- 
sion: 
This Flowery Overflow may swamp Creation 
Suppose Ah-Sing should catch J.B.  asleep, 
And ply his pigden to our ruination! 
Hard work,   short  commons?   'Taint the modern style 
Short hours,   long pay seems Labour's latest charter 
Ah-Sing may slave,   eat stick, half starve,  and smile. 
Yet  that sleek Mongol may yet  turn out  to be a Tartar. 
While the American press pondered the possibilities of a flood 
of cheap Chinese  labor,   the British press became concerned with economic 
competition in Asia.     Thomas Knox,  an American merchant   from Shanghai, 
wrote a succinct  indictment of Chinese  commercial expansion for the 
English Fortnightly Review in 1878.    The article,  entitled "John Compra- 
dor" briefly outlined the history of  the China trade and stressed the 
necessity of the Chinese comprador as a middleman.    "It  is  interesting 
and pityful to see how completely the merchant  in Far Cathay is in the 
hands of the comprador," Knox wrote.       "John Comprador" was active in 
what had previously been British ports of trade such as Bangkok, Ran- 
goon, Penang, Malacca,  Singapore, Java,  and ManlU.    Knox forsaw unlimited 
expansion of Chinese  competition,   even 
into outright British possessions: 
1 
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Thus  far  the Chinese question has no  importance in India,  but 
if we may  judge of that  country by others where the Celestials, 
have taken foothold,   the discussion of the subject  in the  land 
of the Vedas and Shastas  can not long be delayed. 
"John Comprador" reflected another  facet of the British  fear of 
the Chinese merchant.     In some way, Knox believed,   the Chinese merchants 
were taking revenge upon Europeans  for past injustices.     "Foreign com- 
merce and  foreign relations were   forced upon China and were a splendid 
thing for us  at   the  start," Knox warned, but now "the Chinese are  taking 
their revenge,  and  in a way quite unexpected to us,  and which some of 
43 
us pronounce unfair."       Knox concluded his article with an unanswered 
query,  "When will John Comprador  consider his revenge complete,  and 
44 
pause,   in his  career of commercial conquest?"      By the seventies, 
Chinese  love of  commercial enterprise turned full circle in the European 
mercantile mind.     The very attributes which had endeared the native 
trader to the British merchant  in 1865 now seemed a source of unknown 
evils.    Chinese  greed and perfidy,  once attributes reserved for man- 
darins,  became  commong characteristics of all Chinese.    Chinese cultural 
stagnation,   the Edinburgh Review speculated,  came  from the natives' 
satisfaction with nothing but  cash to gamble;  the Chinese had no reli- 
45 
gion,  because religion does not produce cash. 
Fear of the Chinese merchant on grounds of his  commercial com- 
petitiveness did  not suddenly explode in the  last few years of the 
seventies.     British apprehensions matched declining trade returns, 
yet financial  status did not represent  the basis  for mercantile suspicion 
The  late  seventies  saw the Shanghai mercantile community's  scrutinizatlon 
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of their own worth as  successful businessmen on the China coast. 
Hostility from the Chinese and British governments and opposition  from 
the home press added to the  foreign merchants'   confusion.    When the 
foreign merchant   found a realistic cause  for his demise—Chinese 
merchantile activity—he reacted with rhetoric made vicious by a 
decade of frustration.     Sometimes   contradicting statements of the prior 
ten years, the Shanghai merchant portrayed his Chinese  counterpart as 
a vengeful  commercial buccaneer,  out to destroy British trade  in Asia. 
When the North China Herald  commented  in 1879,   "The commercial heavens 
46 
are hung with black,   the mercantile day is turned to rayless night," 
far more was  implied than mere lowered profits.     The Shanghai merchant 
entertained a dark and gloomy spirit,  filled with images of betrayal 
and  imminent doom.     This spirit exemplified the death throes of the 
Shanghai merchant  prince. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND  CONCLUSIONS 
During the last  twenty years of  the nineteenth century China's 
foreign trade  followed  the pattern established  In the decade of the 
1870's.    The China trade exhibited  first a decline and then a stagna- 
tion until well   into  the 1890's.    As a result  of the  lack of commercial 
opportunity and  the Chinese merchants'   surprising ability to control 
the available  trade  foreign merchants  turned  to auxiliaries of com- 
mercial enterprise such as banking and  industrialization in hope of 
restoring their profits.    Foreign-owned railroads appeared after  1895, 
mining operations began on a  large scale in 1896, and foreign manu- 
facturing in shipyards,   silk and  food processing, and public utilities 
started in the  last decades of  the 1800's.    This swing toward productive 
industrial enterprise  implied a dramatic change  in the nature of the 
China trade.     British merchants  in China redefined  the boundaries of 
their operation and 'ransfered  capital   from purely    cash-and-carry 
ventures to much more profitable  spheres of enterprise.    In particular, 
the growth of  foreign-owned bank and  loan institutions offered a good 
return.    The   integration of foreign banks into the Chinese economic 
system brought together  the realism of politics  and business.    The 
very fact of mercantile  advance  in the  late century indicated a .hang, 
in the attitude  of the Foreign Office,   for without official   blessing, 
the  foreign merchant  in China was relatively helpless.    In the last 
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decades of the nineteenth century,   the Foreign Office gradually abandoned 
the co-operative policy and  adopted a less passive stance on world-wide 
economic penetration.    A shift of political power in Great Britain from 
Gladstone's   liberal government  to Disraeli's government  in the early 
1870's signaled  a conservative revival and a growth of the belief in 
the future of a British empire.    As C. A.  Bodelson maintained,  "With a 
-apidity and completeness which seemed almost  incredible,   the Separatist 
2 
school in England practically vanished  from the face of  the earth." 
Protestations of belief in the future of  the empire and pride in her 
extent and greatness became part of common political rhetoric.    Strong 
national   jealousies and rivalries  between continental European powers 
encouraged scrambles  for territories and  in the latter part of the 
nineteenth  century, Western nations partitioned vast territories  in 
central,  east,  and west Africa.    Asia also felt the impact of the 
resurgence of imperialism;   the Russians established Vladivostoke in 
1860,  the  British annexed Burma in  1886,   the French assumed a protector- 
ate over Annam in 1883,  and  the Japanese recognized the independence of 
Korea in  1876.    The Chinese government,   fearful of imminent partition, 
planned a hasty program of Westernization  to meet the challenge.    Chinese 
officials obtained   loans  from foreign banks and granted railway and 
mining rights  to western mercantile   interests.     Increased political 
pressure allowed  British speculators to expand  into economic  fields 
that had been denied  them twenty years before.    While tht   Foreign 0 
did not adopt an overtly pro-mercantile policy,   they did    cact t 
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international pressures  In such a way as to allow mercantile  interests 
in China greater  freedom for economic penetration.    Thus the movement 
of foreign traders  into  industrialization represented a change in the 
style of enterprise and a dramatic change  in the attitude of the Foreign 
office toward economic penetration in China. 
The  change in Foreign Office policy and  the subsequent resurgence 
of financial  opportunity  came well after the demise of the Shanghai 
merchant  prince.     By the mid-eighties only the last vestiges  of the 
old China-house  trade and  its romantic appeal remained.    The Shanghai 
traders suffered   the misfortune of carrying on business during the 
nadir of European imperialist  sympathy.    Until about mid-century,   the 
forces of  laissez-faire economics carried the foreign merchant  from 
success to  success.    British merchants reflected an optimism and a 
confident assumption of ability to solve any question, whether of 
science,   theology or  government.    The  success of the trading factories 
and forts   in South and  Southeast Asia  led British merchants to assume 
that the problems of the  China trade, while difficult, were not insur- 
mountable with continued assistance from the Foreign Office.    In the 
late 1860's   the British government adopted the so-called "Co-operative 
Policy'1 which,   in the eyes of the British merchants, effectively broke 
the continuity of British mercantile success  in Asia.     Based on the 
assumption  that   the China trade was not worth  the risk of establishing 
a British empire  in China,   the "Co-operative Policy" stressed n. -infr- 
ference in Chinese domestic affairs.    After a brief commercial re- 
in the late  1860's  the China trade declined and  then stagnated until   the 
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late 1890's.     As trade  faltered, mercantile optimism turned to bitter- 
ness and confusion.     Treaty port merchants attacked  the policies of the 
Foreign Office and blamed the passivity of British diplomats for economic 
distress in the China trade.     Friction between mercantile and diplomatic 
interests existed throughout  the nineteenth century despite drastic 
changes  in the  nature of  the  China market.     The degree of animosity 
•-aried  from the  intense distrust of the seventies to the relative  com- 
patibility of   the nineties,  but  at no  time were merchants and politicians 
of a single mind.    Within this   larger  context of constant political and 
commercial strife,  British mercantile endeavors evolved at a rapid rate 
because of technological alterations. 
Technological  advance such as  the telegraph and steamship greatly 
improved  the over-all efficiency of trade in the early seventies.    The 
maturation of  the China market  spelled an end  to an era of business 
activities  characterized by speculation and independent action.    De- 
creasing distance between the China trades and  the European market 
squelched  the  Shanghai merchant's  excessive  sense of arrogance and 
mission.    The  cultural vanity and rabid institutional pride which had 
sustained   the  Shanghai merchants may seem distasteful and even ludicrous 
today.    Yet a  feeling of pride and solidarity was necessary for any 
Sreat commercial  achievement,  and,  in fact,  Shanghai did dominate China's 
foreign trade well  into the twentieth century.     Synonymous with Shanghai's 
pride and  solidarity was an  isolationist outlook vl.lch w   rpe    mercMtU 
perspectives on  commercial  enterprise.    As  trade failed to  i,Pr,vc   iitet 
the triumph of the Opium War,  British merchants vlewd  the economic   Bcene 
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from their   tiny  islands  of  independent enterprise and drew erroneous 
notions as   to the causes of  their problems.    Multiple local currencies, 
numerous  petty middlemen,   corrupt officials,  arbitrary taxes,  and  foot- 
dragging diplomats both   in Great Britain and China seemed to constitute 
the barriers   in the path of  commercial progress.    It is undoubtably true 
that these   circumstances  constituted grounds  for complaint but  they were 
,iot the real causes for  commercial  failure.    The essential obstacle that 
hampered   foreign  trade was  the very nature of Chinese civilization.    As 
an agricultural  country with a we11-developed and self-contained marketing 
system, China had   little use   for British wares. 
British concepts of  the Chinese merchant  formed a part of the 
myth of the  China trade.     Treaty port residents based their opinions 
of the Chinese  traders on much the  same sources of information that 
gave rise   to  the  ideas of China as an unrealized  commercial "El Dorado." 
Limited personal  contacts with the Chinese populace and native traders, 
dependence  on biased governmental sources  for domestic current events, 
and the predominance of nineteenth century ethnic attitudes combined 
in the British mind  to form hazy images of the Chinese merchant. 
Furthermore  the complexities  of rapidly evolving marketing methods and 
technological advancements altered  the very nature of the China trade 
and created  a period of maladjustment among treaty port residents  in 
the 1870's.     All of these pressures resulted in fluctuating perception. 
of the Chinese  trader which often had as  little basis in fact «  British 
mercantile belief that corrupt officials or arbitrary taxation prevented 
the western  economic penetration of China. 
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Prior  to the  1870's British merchants  saw the Chinese trader 
as part  of the universal brotherhood of commercial entrepreneur, and 
•is such,  his  social class represented an ally with compatible goals 
and familiar methods of enterprise.    British merchants identified native 
traders  as a hard-working and industrious   "middle class" which was some- 
how more moral  than other groups  in Chinese society:     firmer,  less 
excitable, more practical and reliable.     The image of the Chinese 
merchant as a  type of  cultural ally remained in force well into the 
late sixties despite  the obvious competition he provided.    The accep- 
tance of  the Chinese merchants'   expansion  into trade which had been 
under British  control  seemed   inconsistent with the arrogant nature of 
the treaty port  residents.    However, when one considers that British 
merchants believed in  the possibility of an open societal split between 
the selfish and  extortionate ruling elite of the country and  the frugal 
and hardworking merchant  class,   foreign quiescence over Chinese competi- 
tion becomes more understandable. 
In the  seventies  British mercantile  images of the native trader 
underwent  considerable   change and by 1880 Chinese merchants appeared in 
treaty port newspapers  as no better  than other Asiatics.    The evolution 
of  the native  trader  from a reliable commercial ally to a sinister and 
prevaricative  threat resulted  from the general depression and lethargy 
of British merchants or British trade after   1870.    As  Improved con, .ica- 
tions and   transportation destroyed  the merchant prince  idea 
port residents underwent  a period of econcni- and social ad,uet,  
not only reshaped   the nature of CC«nercUl   en,   prise but drasticaU, 
altered the  image of their former allies. 
i 
Mercantile  uneasiness  about  their position on the China coast 
was clear  in  the early seventies.    A period of unwarranted  fear per- 
vaded Shanghai after the Tientsin massacre.     Stories of imminent  in- 
vasion by unnumbered masses of outraged Chinese peasants prompted the 
construction of  fortifications and a rash of articles downgrading Chinese 
characteristics.     During these years  the semantics applied to Chinese 
merchants underwent   gradual change.    The honesty of Chinese traders or 
merchants was  no  longer a watchword and by mid-decade the native trader 
appeared as  a  commercial villain.    The rise of foreign mercantile  fears 
about Chinese  commercial expansion coincided with Western reaction tc 
Chinese immigration  and  labor competition.    Western  literature in the 
period after   1875 reflected a general   fear of the "Yellow Peril."    As 
parr of the "Peril,"  Chinese merchants would  supposedly gain control 
of Britain's Asian market  as a  form of revenge for past misdealings 
and unequal  treaties.    Although certainly not all westerners believed 
this theory,   enough  credence was  given to the Yellow Perif theory that 
articles   in  the British and American press began frequently to portray 
the Chinese as   subtle and aggressive.     The Chinese worked to control 
labor in  far-flung lands  such as  the western United States and schemed 
to control  commerce   in their own backyard.    In the minds of the more 
radical British mercantile  interests,   it only seemed  a matter of time 
,   eve. India  fell  into   the  clutches of the oriental tide.    Although 
this view represented only  the outermost fringe of Brltl* reaction to 
the Chinese merchant,   it serve,  to illustrate  the wide ra v      t    ■ .    L* 
images of native competition. 
I 
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Mercantile sentiment does not appear  clear-cut because of the 
contradictory pressures  involved:     the commercial advantages of the 
Suez Canal  and  the telegraph  tremendously increased  the potential of 
the China trade but  they also destroyed  the prestige of "merchant 
prince" status;   the emergence of  the Chinese merchant  could be per- 
ceived as an advancement  of western commerce and a crack in the wall 
of Chinese exclusiveness,  but  at  the same time native competition 
monopolized what  little trade existed and eroded  the British dream of 
a profitable China market.    Superimposed on these contradictory realities 
of the China trade were   the popular ethnic attitudes  of the  late nine- 
teenth century.     In British mercantile  thought during the early 1870's 
and more  forcefully at  the end of the century,   European racial  theories 
distorted  images of the native  trader. 
Whether  the British merchants were  correct  in their ultimate 
negative  perceptions of  the Chinese trader  is  irrelevant.    What is 
important  is   that by the mid  1870's British merchants  in China faced 
up to the realization  that one of their  concepts about the China trade 
had  little or no basis   in  fact.     British merchants  could argue endlessly 
with the Foreign Office about  the  imagined barriers  to trade in China or 
the supposed positive results of a treaty revision that  satisfied mer- 
cantile demands.    However the success of the Chinese merchant  in meeting 
British  competition and more than holding their own constituted a reality 
that was  not  as debatable as  the predicted effect,  of some  future removal 
of  inland   taxation or guarantee  of access  to the   interior.    By 1870 it 
was  clear   that  Chinese merchants were astute businessmen who had a firm 
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grip on China's domestic marketing system;  no amount of supposed 
Rritish  cultural or  intellectual superiority  could break this 
hold.    The realization by British merchants  that Chinese traders did 
not represent a commercial  ally whose activities would hasten western 
penetration of the China market marked the  first  explosion of a widely 
held mercantile myth about  the China trade. 
British acknowledgment of Chinese commercial superiority in 
their native country  involved  a painful period of mental depression 
from which sprung most  of the more radical   images of the Chinese mer- 
chant.     Elements of fear and racial arrogance combined  in the British 
mind to form images of a vengeful  commercial enemy set upon the destruc- 
tion of Britain's Asian trade.     In a more positive  light,   the British 
merchants'   acceptance of at   least one reality of the China market, 
the dominance of the Chinese merchant, was partly responsible  for a 
shift in  the nature of  foreign enterprise.    The shift  in the periphery 
of enterprise  from cash-and-carry ventures  to banking and construction 
eventually   led   foreign merchants   to their financial "El Dorado."    By 
the twentieth century  imperialist domination extended  to China's entire 
financial  structure.  The  final decade of the nineteenth century over- 
shadowed  the preceding decades  of quieter commercial penetration and 
gave rise  to future hatreds of the whole  treaty system. 
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CHAPTER VI 
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50-79. 
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York:     Howard  Fertig,   1968),  p.   79. 
3S. W. Williams,  The Middle Kingdom,  II  (New York:    Paragon 
Book Reprint  Corp.,   1966),   193.    The Chinese had always been considered 
as morally superior  to the Indians, who were unrivaled  in culturally 
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